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DECISIONAL SEQUENCING
Peter B. Rutledge*
“[T]he definition of the alternatives is the supreme instrument of 
power. . . .”1
ABSTRACT
Judicial decision-making consists of two sets of choices—(1) how to 
resolve the issues in a case and (2) how to decide the order in which those 
issues will be resolved. Much legal scholarship focuses on the first ques-
tion; too little focuses on the second. This Article aims to fill that gap. 
Drawing across disciplines—philosophy, economics, and political 
science—this Article articulates a theory of “decisional sequencing.” Deci-
sional sequencing concerns the extent to which legal rules constrain—and 
do not constrain—the order in which judges and other quasi-judicial actors 
(like arbitrators) decide matters before them. To what extent do the deci-
sion-makers enjoy unfettered discretion? To what extent can the parties 
manipulate the decisional sequence? The Article first considers a simple 
model of sequencing rules that classifies decisional sequences into three 
forms—horizontal sequencing rules that govern the decisional order for a 
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Dodson, Chris Drahozal, Heather Elliot, Richard Nagareda, Stacie Strong, and Mike Zimmer pro-
vided invaluable comments on the draft. Erin O’Hara and Ingrid Wuerth provided thoughtful insights 
during the formative stages of this project. The faculty at the Loyola University of Chicago provided 
wonderful feedback even when a sick child and cancelled flight scuttled their kind invitation to a 
colloquium. My colleagues in the University of Georgia Law School half-baked lunch series provided 
extremely helpful comments when this paper was still raw sushi. John DeGenova and Andrew Pinson 
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 1. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE 68 (1960) (emphasis omitted). 
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single decision-maker, vertical sequencing rules that govern when a deci-
sion-maker’s rulings can be appealed to a reviewing body such as an ap-
pellate court, and transjurisdictional sequencing rules that govern the ex-
tent to which decision-makers will defer to each other in parallel proceed-
ings. It draws on examples from both civil litigation and arbitration to 
demonstrate how sequencing rules vary across these two “forms” of dis-
pute resolution. After flushing out the contours of the simple model, the 
Article then considers the extent to which sequencing rules operate as 
mandatory rules (from which parties cannot derogate) and the extent to 
which they operate as default rules (around which the parties can con-
tract). The Article concludes by considering how the model developed 
here can be used to help solve several decisional sequencing dilemmas 
currently bedeviling courts and arbitrators. 
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Any judge faces two sets of choices in a case. First, she must decide 
how to resolve each of the issues before her. Second, she must also decide 
the order in which she will resolve these issues. This Article concerns the 
second set of choices—the “decisional sequence.” Consider the following 
example inspired by an actual case: 
After a major terrorist attack on the United States, victims’ fami-
lies sue members of the Saudi Royal Family, some of whom are 
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government officials, and allege that these individuals aided and 
abetted the attack. Saudi Arabia, a major political and economic 
ally of the United States, lodges formal protests about the lawsuit 
with the Department of State. Thereafter, the United States Gov-
ernment files a statement of interest urging the district court to 
dismiss the case under the political question and comity doctrines. 
The members of the Saudi royal family move to dismiss the case 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (due to sovereign immunity), 
lack of personal jurisdiction (for those nongovernmental members 
of the royal family), forum non conveniens, and the act of state 
doctrine.2
The judge confronts at least six potential grounds for dismissal—lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, 
the political question doctrine, the comity doctrine, and the act of state 
doctrine. 
Suppose that the judge determines the case is a clear candidate for 
dismissal on political question grounds but a much closer call on the other 
grounds. She might dispose of the case through one of several opinions. In 
one opinion, she could simply dismiss the case on political question 
grounds. In another opinion, she might reject the first five defenses and, 
only thereafter, address the political question issue. 
While both opinions achieve the same outcome, the decisional se-
quence is critical in several respects. For one thing, it involves different 
investment of resources by the court—the first opinion involves a far lower 
investment than the second. For another thing, the decisional sequence has 
a different impact on the parties. The first opinion amounts to a clear vic-
tory for the defendants, while the second might be a terrible defeat if, for 
example, the judge concluded that the Saudi defendants were in fact sub-
ject to the personal jurisdiction of U.S. courts before dismissing the case. 
Finally, the decisional sequence has an impact on development of the law. 
The first opinion simply adds a precedent to one field—political question; 
the second (potentially) adds a precedent to six (depending on whether the 
ruling on the other defenses could be deemed dicta).3
These are not the only choices available to the judge. The plaintiffs 
might request jurisdictional discovery before the judge rules on the defen-
dants’ motion. In that case, the judge might conclude that she needs fur-
 2. This fact pattern draws on the many civil complaints filed after the September 11 attacks. See, 
e.g., Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. and Dev. Corp., 292 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 3. The latter opinion risks sowing great confusion if it fails to make clear which findings are 
“holdings” and which are dicta. On the dangers of dicta, see Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the 
Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249 (2006). Special thanks to Andrea Bjorkland 
for her thoughts on this point. 
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ther information before ruling and order discovery.4 If she did so, such an 
order would have very different consequences compared to the two above-
described outcomes. It would entail a lower investment of resources by the 
judge and have a more limited impact on the development of legal doc-
trine. As to the parties’ interests, however, an order of jurisdictional dis-
covery would increase the burden on the defendants and might even com-
pel the disclosure of information that the defendants prefer to keep confi-
dential. Collectively, these two effects could increase pressure on the de-
fendants to settle—even before the judge rules on the defendants’ merito-
rious motion to dismiss. Moreover, any order of jurisdictional discovery 
likely would be unreviewable (unless somehow the defendant requested an 
appellate court to issue an extraordinary writ of mandamus).5 In this re-
spect, the decisional sequence can influence the very outcome of a case. 
Despite the importance of decisional sequences to the parties’ beha-
vior, legal development, and outcomes, they have received remarkably 
little attention in the legal literature.6 With rare exception, most literature 
in this field merely has offered normative arguments for or against particu-
lar doctrinal rules (such as in the fields of federal civil rights claims, con-
stitutional doubt, or civil rights claims).7 Almost no scholarship has consi-
dered decisional sequencing in law more systematically (or the unique 
issues presented in the context of international dispute resolution).8
This ignorance is surprising. In recent years, courts and lawmakers 
have paid increased attention to issues of decisional sequencing, particular-
ly in the context of international dispute resolution. They have developed a 
 4. For an excellent discussion of jurisdictional discovery and its broader implications for federal 
practice, see S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal Courts, 67 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 489 (2010). 
 5. See Strong, supra note 72, at 503–05. 
 6. Some prior scholarship has considered aspects of this issue such as specific areas of sequenc-
ing (like the Steel Company-Rurhgas line) or sequencing in a particular context (like Supreme Court 
voting behavior). See Heather Elliott, Jurisdictional Resequencing and Restraint, 43 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 725 (2009); Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal 
Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2001); Maxwell L. Stearns, Should Justices Ever Switch Votes?: 
Miller v. Albright in Social Choice Perspective, 7 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 87 (1999). Another stream of 
literature has focused on the Court’s sometimes arbitrary classification of rules of “jurisdictional” vs 
“nonjurisdictional” and the ramifications of that classification, including on the order of decision. See 
Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
 7. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 
SUP. CT. REV. 115 (2009); Stephen I. Vladeck, AEDPA, Saucier, and the Stronger Case for Rights-
First Constitutional Adjudication, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 595 (2009); Thomas Healy, The Rise of 
Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847 (2005); John M.M. Greabe, Mirabile Dic-
tum!: The Case for “Unnecessary” Constitutional Rulings in Civil Rights Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 403 (1999); Sam Kamin, An Article III Defense of Merits-First Decision-making in 
Civil Rights Litigation: The Continued Viability of Saucier v. Katz, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 53 
(2008); Michael L. Wells, The “Order-of-Battle” in Constitutional Litigation, 60 SMU L. REV. 1539 
(2007). 
 8. For a rare exception, see Idleman, supra note 6. 
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series of rules—“sequencing rules”—that, to a degree, guide the order in 
which judges, and judge-like actors such as arbitrators, decide issues. 
Those rules vary greatly. Sometimes, they constrain the order of judi-
cial decision-making. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment—
which rejected the doctrine of hypothetical jurisdiction (under which 
courts could assume jurisdiction and then dismiss a case on 12(b)(6) 
grounds)—supplies one example.9 In other instances, sequencing rules 
accord courts great discretion to determine the order in which they decide 
matters. Ruhrgas v. Marathon Oil, Co.—which allows district courts to 
dismiss a case on personal jurisdiction grounds before deciding whether 
they have subject matter jurisdiction—supplies an example.10 Sinochem 
International v. Malaysia International Shipping Co.—which allows dis-
trict courts to dismiss a case on forum non conveniens grounds before 
deciding any jurisdictional objections—also exemplifies an approach grant-
ing a great deal of discretion to district courts.11
Applying those rules to the hypothetical case given at the front of the 
paper, the judge could not resolve the case on the ground that the com-
plaint failed to state a claim before she had determined whether jurisdic-
tion existed. She could, however, resolve the case on certain “non-merits” 
grounds (like lack of personal jurisdiction or forum non conveniens) be-
fore addressing the thorny issue of subject matter jurisdiction under the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. As we shall see later in this paper, the 
judge inclined to resolve the case on political question or comity grounds 
will confront substantial uncertainty over whether she may do so before 
ruling on the jurisdictional defenses. 
Recent jurisprudence in the area of federal civil rights litigation re-
veals that the Court is uncertain over the extent to which sequencing rules 
should constrain, as opposed to expand, trial court discretion.12 When a 
public official asserts a defense of qualified immunity, a court undertakes 
a three-part analysis: (1) did the public official violate a constitutional 
right, (2) was the right clearly established, and (3) was the official conduct 
reasonable.13 For a period of time following the creation of this test, lower 
federal courts often elided the first step and held that the officer was en-
titled to qualified immunity on the ground that, even if the right were vi-
olated, it was not clearly established.14 In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme 
 9. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). 
 10. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999). 
 11. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Co., 549 U.S. 422 (2007). 
 12. See Michael L. Wells and Alice Snedeker, State-Created Property and Due Process of Law: 
Filling the Void Left by Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 44 GA. L. REV. 161 (2009). 
 13. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982). 
 14. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc), aff’d, 526 U.S. 603 
(1999); Jean v. Collins, 155 F.3d 701, 708 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc), rev’d and remanded, 526 U.S. 
1142 (1999). 
8
6 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 62:1:1 
Court sought to halt this jurisprudential move and imposed a strict order 
on the qualified immunity analysis.15 The Saucier rule added to the work-
load of lower federal courts but also helped to facilitate the creation of a 
more detailed constitutional jurisprudence governing federal civil rights 
claims. 
Yet less than two decades later, in Pearson v. Callahan, the Court re-
versed itself and reinstated the pre-Saucier regime under which lower fed-
eral courts did not have to observe a particular sequence in deciding an 
officer’s entitlement to qualified immunity.16 The differences between the 
Saucier and Pearson regimes illustrate the importance of decisional se-
quencing on both the law and outcomes. The Saucier rule was likely to 
lead to the greater production of constitutional law (since courts had to 
address the first issue).17 It also could have a greater impact on future cas-
es, since each decision addressing the first step of the Saucier analysis 
could lay the groundwork for a right to be “clearly established” in a later 
case.18 By contrast, under the Pearson rule, courts could resolve cases 
without elaborating on the scope of constitutional rights and, instead, dis-
miss the case on the ground that the right was not clearly established.19
This obviously reduced the production of constitutional law and also af-
fected future cases by making it more difficult, if not impossible, to dem-
onstrate that a right was “clearly established” at the time of official con-
duct. 
The sequencing rules discussed so far—ones that regulate decisions by 
a single judicial actor—are not the only ones operating in a judicial sys-
tem. Sequencing rules also influence action across different strata of a 
single judicial system. Suppose that the judge in the initial hypothetical 
enters an order rejecting all of the proposed grounds for dismissal. Is any 
of them immediately appealable? The final judgment rule generally bars 
appellate courts from exercising jurisdiction over a case until the district 
court has entered final judgment.20 Of course, that rule is subject to impor-
tant exceptions, whether congressionally created, arising under the colla-
teral order doctrine or through extraordinary actions such as writs of man-
damus.21 The coexistence of these regimes—final judgment and interlocu-
tory review—has similar implications to the coexistence of the Steel Com-
pany-Ruhrgas-Sinochem rules described above. To the extent a district 
 15. 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
 16. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 813 (2009). 
 17. Saucier, 553 U.S. at 200 (requiring the first inquiry to be whether a constitutional right would 
have been violated). 
 18. Id. at 199. 
 19. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 813. 
 20. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). 
 21. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949); 28 U.S.C. § 1651 
(2006). 
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court’s order is immediately appealable, that decisional sequence requires 
an up-front investment of resources by appellate courts (and reduces the 
corresponding investment of resources by district courts). It further influ-
ences law development by allowing the creation of appellate opinions on 
the appealable issues. Finally, it affects the parties’ settlement incentives 
(immediate appealability of an adverse order enhances the settlement posi-
tion of the losing party in the district court’s order; a bar on immediate 
appeal has the opposite effect). 
Sequencing rules also influence outcomes between different judicial 
systems. Suppose, for example, that some of the victims in the above-cited 
hypothetical were citizens of a foreign country, and their survivors and 
estates bring an action in that foreign country. Or suppose that a foreign 
government commences criminal proceedings against the suspected terror-
ists. Must the United States district judge stay her proceedings pending the 
outcome of that case? If she’s not required to issue the stay, does she have 
the discretionary power to do so? Alternatively, can she issue an antisuit 
injunction against the foreign civil proceeding? Again, like the other sorts 
of sequencing rules described above, the answers to these questions have 
important effects on the investment of judicial resources, development of 
the law, and the parties’ settlement incentives. 
This Article provides a coherent theory about these and other sequenc-
ing rules. At bottom, I argue that the order in which courts decide issues 
has a significant and underappreciated impact on the law. First, it influ-
ences the parties’ litigation behavior, including their settlement incentives. 
A sequencing rule which forces district judges to address dismissal 
grounds in a particular order generally favors plaintiffs, who can use the 
leverage of a favorable ruling on an early issue to drive their opponents to 
settle. By contrast, a sequencing rule that accords judges more latitude to 
decide issues in a particular order generally favors defendants, who can 
thereby advance several defenses simultaneously and thereby avoid ad-
verse rulings on a particular issue. 
Second, decisional sequencing influences the development of the law. 
A sequencing rule that requires district courts to resolve questions in a 
particular order generally ensures a greater production of law on questions 
that the judges must decide first. By contrast, a sequencing rule that ac-
cords district courts greater discretion to resolve issues in any particular 
order facilitates the creation of law in a wider array of areas. 
Third, decisional sequencing rules influence the investment of judicial 
resources. Strict sequencing rules (like Steel Company) can increase the 
required investment by forcing judges to work through potentially trickier 
doctrinal issues before resolving a case on a relatively easier one. By con-
trast, relaxed sequencing rules (like Ruhrgas and Sinochem) reduce the 
required investment of judicial resources to resolve a case. 
9
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The Article unfolds in four parts. Part I develops a model of decision-
al sequencing rules. It categorizes sequencing rules into three clusters: 
horizontal sequencing rules, vertical sequencing rules, and transjurisdic-
tional sequencing rules. Horizontal sequencing rules determine the order 
in which a single decision-maker considers issues. Vertical sequencing 
rules determine the order in which issues are decided between first-order 
decision-makers (such as district judges or arbitrators) and reviewing deci-
sion-makers (such as appellate courts or, in the case of arbitrators, district 
courts). “Transjurisdictional sequencing rules” determine the order in 
which issues are decided by two decision-makers in different jurisdictions,
often in the course of parallel proceedings. 22
After introducing the categories, Part I then places these ideas in the 
existing literature on decision theory. This literature review draws on oth-
er disciplines, including philosophy, economics, political science, and 
psychology. The concept finds roots in Condorcet’s seminal work on ma-
jority preferences, which taught how the order in which a decision-maker 
is presented a set of preferences can influence the outcome along a deci-
sion tree. Economists like Kenneth Arrow drew on these insights to dem-
onstrate the importance of a decisional sequence to voting outcomes. 
Likewise, political scientists like John Kingdon drew on these insights to 
demonstrate how sequencing rules in Congress influenced legislative out-
comes. Part I concludes by translating the relevant lessons from these lite-
rature streams into the theory of decisional sequencing. 
Part II then develops a simple model of how sequencing rules operate. 
All sequencing rules—whether horizontal, vertical or transjurisdictional—
exert profound effects on judicial behavior, parties’ settlement incentives, 
and law development. Despite the commonality of these values to all three 
types of sequencing rules, they promote (and hinder) those values in dif-
ferent ways. For example, as Part II explains, a horizontal sequencing rule 
like Sinochem (that allows a court to resolve a case on forum non conve-
niens grounds before turning to jurisdiction) reduces a district court’s in-
vestment of resources, improves a defendant’s settlement leverage, and 
can lead to an increased production of law on forum non conveniens 
(while reducing production of law in another area, like jurisdiction). Yet 
other rules (such as the bar on the immediate appealability of orders deny-
ing motions to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens) undercut 
these values—they increase the workload of district courts, enhance the 
plaintiffs’ settlement leverage, and reduce the production of appellate 
precedent on the issue. Other examples of these conflicts and tensions ab-
 22. See Jonathan Remy Nash, The Uneasy Case for Transjurisdictional Adjudication, 94 VA. L.
REV. 1869, 1871 (2008). 
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ound in various sequencing rules. Part II tries to reconcile the ways in 
which sequencing rules appear to work at cross purposes. 
Part III explores the extent to which parties can contractually manipu-
late decisional sequencing rules. Forum selection clauses and arbitration 
clauses represent two familiar examples of how parties can influence con-
tractually the sequence by which decisions are rendered. While the law 
generally promotes these contractual modifications of sequencing rules, 
important limits exist. This enables a meaty discussion about the extent to 
which decisional sequencing rules can (and should be) default rules (as 
opposed to mandatory rules). As with the simple model developed in Part 
II, the law on sequencing rules is replete with seemingly contradictory 
results. Consider two vertical sequencing rules: (1) denials of motions to 
dismiss for improper venue due to a forum selection clause are not imme-
diately appealable and (2) denials of motions to compel arbitration due to 
an arbitration clause are immediately appealable. In both cases, the party 
bringing the motion is attempting to accomplish exactly the same result—
prevent a party from attempting to shirk on a preexisting contractual obli-
gation to resolve all disputes in an agreed-upon forum. Yet, in one in-
stance sequencing rules facilitate that objective; in another, they do not. 
This Part again attempts to explain some of those seemingly contradictory 
outcomes. 
Part IV applies the model to several current sequencing problems be-
deviling courts and policymakers. As to horizontal sequencing rules, I 
address the limits of the Steel Co.-Sinochem line of cases—specifically 
whether defenses like the act of state doctrine should represent “non-
merits” defenses that can be resolved at the district court’s discretion or, 
instead, are more akin to merits defenses that must await resolution of 
jurisdictional objections. As to vertical sequencing rules, I take up the 
immediate appealability of denials of motions to dismiss under the political 
question and comity doctrines, a topic of special importance in the area of 
international civil litigation. As to transjurisdictional sequencing rules, I 
address the thorny issues of antisuit injunctions and lis pendens stays in 
transnational litigation. 
Before turning to the argument, I should make plain two biases that in-
fluence the methodology employed in the paper. First, the paper draws 
heavily on international matters. Due to the choice of examples, it is worth 
stressing that the ideas developed herein are not unique to international 
cases but apply equally to purely domestic ones. Nonetheless, international 
cases trigger a unique set of considerations such as comity which would be 
absent in a paper limited to purely domestic examples. Second, the paper 
highlights the relevance of arbitration to the theoretical inquiry. This em-
phasis brings more starkly into relief the parallels between international 
10
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arbitration and international civil litigation as related “forms” of dispute 
resolution.23 As I hope to show, the two fields, though often regrettably 
discussed in isolation from each other, present powerfully overlapping 
issues when analyzed with regard to decisional sequencing. 
I. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
This Part does three things.24 Subpart A articulates a three-part typol-
ogy of sequencing rules. It argues that decisional sequencing rules come in 
three forms: (1) horizontal rules, which constrain a single actor’s decision-
making; (2) vertical sequencing rules, which control appellate review 
across a single jurisdictional system; and (3) transjurisdictional rules, 
which constrain an actor’s decision-making in cases that touch upon more 
than one jurisdiction. Subpart B identifies the various lenses through 
which we might view decisional sequencing rules. These lenses include 
economics, political science and path dependence theory. It shows how 
each of those lenses supplies some relevant guidance on decisional se-
quencing rules, but none of them, standing alone, suffices. Finally, em-
ploying the guidance from the preexisting lenses, Subpart C articulates a 
novel theory for conceptualizing decisional sequencing rules. 
A. Typology 
A preliminary typology helps to frame a discussion about decisional 
sequencing rules. To that end, I believe it is appropriate to divide deci-
sional sequencing rules into three types—horizontal, vertical, and transju-
risdictional. 
Horizontal rules determine the sequence in which a single decision-
maker—a judge, an appellate court, or an arbitrator—determines issues. 
An exemplary line of recent precedent is the Steel Co.-Ruhrgas-Sinochem
line of cases discussed above. This trio of cases sets forth certain decision-
al sequencing rules for district courts about how they should resolve merits 
and non-merits defenses. Specifically, under Steel Co., a court may not 
assume the existence of jurisdiction (where the jurisdictional questions are 
difficult) in order to decide cases on easier “merits based” grounds.25
Ruhrgas and Sinochem tempered the reach of Steel Co.’s rule by providing 
that courts need not resolve subject matter jurisdiction before turning to 
personal jurisdiction (Ruhrgas), and that courts can also dismiss cases on 
 23. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). 
 24. Special thanks to Ingrid Wuerth for her structural suggestions here. 
 25. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 84 (1998). 
2010] Decisional Sequencing 11 
grounds of forum non conveniens without resolving either subject matter 
or personal jurisdiction (Sinochem).26
Vertical sequencing rules determine when reviewing bodies can re-
solve decisions of inferior tribunals. For students of civil procedure, the 
final judgment rule (and its well known exceptions) provide a familiar 
example.27 Generally speaking, appellate courts only review final judg-
ments of district courts; under narrow exceptions, they can review certain 
orders before final judgment, such as under statutory exceptions, the Co-
hen doctrine, a Rule 54(b) certification, or on a writ of mandamus.28 Arbi-
tration has similar doctrines. While practices vary radically across coun-
tries, most national arbitration laws regulate the timing of when courts can 
review an arbitrator’s decisions.29
Transjurisdictional sequencing rules channel disputes in parallel litiga-
tion. By parallel litigation, I mean the common phenomenon in dispute 
resolution, particularly international dispute resolution, where parties have 
claims against each other, and each party files its claims in its preferred 
forum.30 Examples of transjurisdictional sequencing rules from domestic 
litigation include Pullman abstention, Burford abstention, Colorado River
abstention, Younger abstention, the Tax Injunction Act, and the Anti-
Injunction Act.31 Examples of transjurisdictional sequencing rules from 
international dispute resolution include exhaustion requirements, forum 
non conveniens dismissals, stays lis alibi pendens, and antisuit injunctions. 
Blocking statutes and clawback statutes also serve as types of transjurisdic-
tional sequencing rules.32 As with horizontal and vertical sequencing rules, 
such transjurisdictional sequencing rules influence law development, judi-
cial behavior, and the parties’ incentives.33
A typology along these lines facilitates richer comparisons than have 
occurred in much of the literature to date. While scholars have considered 
many of these issues in isolation from each other, there has been virtually 
no systematic attempt to consider them collectively.34 These isolated de-
 26. Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 423 (2007); Ruhrgas 
AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 579 (1999). 
 27. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). 
 28. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
 29. See infra note 70. 
 30. See GARY BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED 
STATES COURTS 521–62 (4th ed. 2006). 
 31. R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 
319 U.S. 315, 332–33 (1943); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 
813 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See also 26 U.S.C. § 7421 (2006); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2283 (2006). 
 32. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 30, at 648–50. 
 33. See Nash, supra note 22, at n. 63. 
 34. See, e.g., Joan Steinman, After Steel Co.: “Hypothetical Jurisdiction” in the Federal Appellate 
Courts, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 855 (2001); Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction,
48 B.C. L. REV. 1237 (2007); Mathew D. Staver, The Abstention Doctrines: Balancing Comity with 
Federal Court Intervention, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 1102 (1998). 
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bates are unfortunate. They cause scholars to overlook important parallels 
between different sorts of rules. I elaborate on these in greater detail, but 
supply a simple example here just to whet the reader’s appetite.  
Consider the Sinochem rule (which allows district judges to consider 
non-merits defenses in any particular order) and the collateral order rule 
(which allows appellate courts to review certain district court orders be-
fore final judgment). At one level, these two doctrines have little to do 
with one another—one concerns entirely the behavior of district courts; the 
other concerns the scope of an appellate court’s jurisdiction. This typifies 
the scholarly inquiry that I describe above in which these doctrines are 
considered in isolation. At another level, however, the two doctrines have 
a great deal in common. For example, both exert a tremendous effect on 
the parties’ settlement incentives. A relatively flexible Sinochem rule aids 
defendants by allowing district courts to resolve cases on one ground 
without first having to render an opinion adverse to the defendant on 
another ground. Similarly, a flexible collateral order doctrine aids defen-
dants by allowing them to obtain immediate correction of an adverse dis-
trict court ruling without having to await final judgment before being able 
to appeal the ruling. Conversely, if Sinochem had come out the other way 
(precluding a non-merits dismissal before the court had resolved subject-
matter and personal jurisdiction) or if the collateral order doctrine did not 
exist, plaintiffs would be in a relatively stronger settlement position, for 
they could leverage the decisional sequences in those cases to their advan-
tage.35
The rules also influence a district court’s investment of time and re-
sources. A relatively inflexible sequencing rule (as some interpreted Steel 
Co.) increases the burden on district courts; it requires them to resolve 
issues in a particular order without regard for whether there might be an 
“easy” ground upon which to resolve a case. Similarly, a relatively strict 
final judgment rule (and a relatively crabbed collateral order rule) also 
increases the burden on district courts by requiring them to invest time and 
resources in a case—investments that might be avoided if, for example, an 
appellate court were to intervene immediately and reverse a district court’s 
refusal to dismiss a case. Due to these and other parallels, it is appropriate 
to consider these two types of rules together in the analysis. 
At the same time, classifying sequencing rules (rather than treating 
them as a single undifferentiated mass) helps sharpen focus on the distinct 
ways in which the rules operate. For example, consider the effect of the 
Sinochem rule and the collateral order rule on the production of legal doc-
trine. Here, the effects are quite different. The Sinochem rule influences 
the quantity, but not quality, of legal opinion on an area of law. If a dis-
 35. This assumes the parties are otherwise in equal bargaining positions at settlement. 
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trict judge can resolve a case on any non-merits ground of her own choos-
ing, the net effect (assuming the judge does not voluntarily choose to over-
invest resources and resolve all issues) is a reduction in the quantity of 
opinion; whereas, if the judge had to resolve issues in a particular order, 
she presumably would create a greater quantity of opinions on the first-
stage issues. By contrast, the collateral order rule influences the quality of 
precedent in an area. A more flexible collateral order rule makes it easier 
to obtain an immediate appellate ruling on certain issues and, thereby, 
create circuit precedent on those issues; whereas, under a decisional re-
gime with a strict final judgment rule, far less appellate opinion would be 
produced and, to the extent it was, the production would come far later 
(only after the case had run its course in the district court and to the extent 
it was not settled in the meantime). 
While the foregoing discussion justifies a comparison of (and differen-
tiation between) horizontal, vertical, and transjurisdictional sequencing 
rules, it also suggests that further differentiation is appropriate. To capture 
the degree of discretion accorded to the judge (or quasi-judicial decision-
maker), it becomes necessary to distinguish between those rules that con-
strict that discretion (rigid sequencing rules) and those that confer some 
discretion on the decision-maker (flexible sequencing rules). This further 
differentiation enables richer comparison. For example, a flexible horizon-
tal sequencing rule (like Sinochem) and a flexible vertical sequencing rule 
(like the collateral order exception) both potentially reduce the investment 
of resources by the first-order decision-maker (i.e., the district court). 
Conversely, more rigid rules—whether a horizontal rule, like Steel Co., or 
a vertical one, like the final judgment rule—require a greater investment of 
resources. 
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Combining the two classificatory variables developed here, it becomes 
possible to classify decisional sequencing rules as follows: 
I return to these and other qualities of decisional sequencing rules later 
in the paper. For now, they simplify and justify the conceptual move to 
treat them within the same analytic framework. The next subpart considers 
the possible theories that allow us to conceptualize sequencing rules. 
B. Literature Review 
Decisional sequencing is not a novel concept. For centuries, philoso-
phers, economists, political scientists, and other scholars have pondered 
how the order in which decisions are presented influences an outcome. It 
is appropriate, therefore, to consider whether those prior efforts supply a 
theoretical construct in which we might analyze the sorts of sequencing 
rules described above. This Subpart considers three such theoretical con-
structs: Condorcet’s work on electoral structures, Kingdon’s work on 
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Horizontal 
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merits ground, in-
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agenda setting, and Paul David’s work on path dependence theory. Each 
theory offers some help in conceptualizing decisional sequencing rules, but 
none supplies a fully satisfactory account of sequencing rules. 
1. Electoral Structures 
The celebrated Marquis de Condorcet posited in his Essai sur 
l’Application de l’Analyse a la Probabilite des Decisions Rendues a la 
Pluralite des Voix that the order in which an electorate is presented a set 
of choices will influence the outcome.36 The noted economist Kenneth 
Arrow later built on Condorcet’s insights through his theory of cycling 
majorities.37 Arrow’s theories have been the subject of extensive commen-
tary elsewhere, which does not require repetition here.38 Suffice it to say, 
for present purposes, Arrow demonstrated how, under certain conditions, 
majorities could be produced for any choice depending on how the choice 
was structured.39
Assume, for example, that in a race among three candidates (A, B, 
and C) the majority preferences would align as follows: 
A > B 
B > C 
C > A 
In case of such a voting alignment, the order of the election (or slightly 
more abstractly to track the ideas developed in this paper, the order of 
“decision”) has a critical influence on the outcome. In a two-stage voting 
game where A is pitted against B first (with the winner facing C), C will 
prevail. By contrast, if the first stage pitted B against C (with the winner 
 36. MARIE JEAN ANTOINE NICOLAS DE CARITAT, MARQUIS DE CONDORCET, ESSAI SUR 
L’APPLICATION DE L’ANALYSE Á LA PROBABILITÉ DES DÉCISIONS RENDUES Á LA PLURALITÉ DES 
VOIX [An Essay on the Application of Probability Theory to Plurality Decision-Making] (1785), re-
printed in IAIN MCLEAN & FIONA HEWITT, CONDORCET: FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE AND 
POLITICAL THEORY 129 (Iain McLean & Fiona Hewitt eds., trans., 1994). For literature on Condorcet 
and some implications of his work on majority preferences, see WILLIAM V. GEHRLEIN,
CONDORCET’S PARADOX (2006); Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, An Empirical Example of the Condorcet 
Paradox of Voting in a Large Electorate, 107 PUB. CHOICE 135, 135–37 (2001); William H. Riker, 
The Paradox of Voting and Congressional Rules for Voting on Amendments, 52 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
349 (1958). 
 37. Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. OF POL. ECON. 328 
(1950). 
 38. See, e.g., Duncan Black, On Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, 12 J.L. & ECON. 227 (1969); 
Allan Gibbard, Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, 41 ECONOMETRICA 587 (1973); 
William H. Riker, Voting and the Summation of Preferences: An Interpretive Bibliographical Review 
of Selected Developments During the Last Decade, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 900 (1961). 
 39. Arrow, supra note 37, at 329. 
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facing A), then A will prevail. The majority’s preferences remain static, 
yet the outcome is critically influenced by the order of the decision.40
Condorcet’s and Arrow’s insights help partly to conceptualize se-
quencing rules. Much like election rules influence the choice of a candi-
date, so too can decisional sequencing rules influence the judge’s choice of 
opinion. Consider again Sinochem in this context. A flexible rule like Si-
nochem presents a one-shot decisional set for the judge where the judge 
can choose from among many possible “candidates” that are grounds upon 
which she can resolve the case. By contrast, a less flexible rule like Steel 
Company, much like an A vs. B ballot, effectively takes certain “candi-
dates” (here, opinions that resolve the grounds on the merits) out of the 
voting sequence. 
While Condorcet’s theory is thus helpful, it does not allow a complete 
account of decisional sequencing rules. It suffers from two fundamental 
limitations. First, the nature of the preferences fundamentally differs. In 
Condorcet’s model, the decisional agent’s preferences directly influence 
the “outcome” (i.e., the winner of the election). By contrast, in the con-
text of decisional sequencing, the judicial actor’s preferences do not neces-
sarily influence the outcome, but rather simply the manner in which the 
judge reaches that outcome. The judge may ultimately dismiss the case, 
and the decisional sequencing rule simply influences either the type of 
opinion the judge writes, or alternatively, the antecedent issues that the 
judge must decide before reaching the ground upon which she can dismiss 
the case. 
Second, Condorcet’s and Arrow’s respective works do not supply 
much guidance on how to optimally construct a set of decisional sequenc-
ing rules. Put another way, as a normative matter, are we better off in a 
system where judges (and other quasi-judicial actors) are largely con-
strained by the order in which they resolve issues? Alternatively, are they 
better off in a system under which they enjoy largely unbridled discretion? 
Neither Condorcet nor Arrow sheds much light on the answer to that ques-
tion.  
2. Agenda Setting 
Scholars such as John Kingdon have explored the “predecisional 
process”—how issues came to be “on the governmental agenda in the first 
place, how the alternatives from which decision-makers chose were gener-
ated, and why some potential issues and some likely alternatives never 
came to be the focus of serious attention.”41 This involves consideration of 
 40. Id.
 41. JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES AND PUBLIC POLICIES 1 (2d. ed. 1985). See 
also Michael E. Levine & Charles R. Plott, Agenda Influence and its Implications, 63 VA. L. REV.
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two distinct concepts. The first is the agenda—understood to mean “the list 
of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people out-
side of government closely associated with those officials, are paying some 
serious attention at any given time.”42 The second is “alternatives”—
understood to mean the options available to the decision-maker to resolve 
the matter on the decision-maker’s agenda. Kingdon’s theory explains how 
different “participants” wield different degrees of influence at various 
stages of the policy-making process—agenda setting and alternative selec-
tion.43 Rules which require legislation first to be referred to the relevant 
legislative committee, followed by a floor vote, comparable action in the 
other house, conference committee work, and ultimately a vote on the 
conference report, ensure a degree of constituent-specific earmarking in 
legislation.44
Kingdon’s work on the relationship agenda setting and alternative spe-
cification provides a useful bridge between decision theory and its applica-
tion to legal cases. Translated into the judicial (or, more generally, dispute 
resolution) context, the agenda consists of the issues that the parties put 
before a judge (or other judicial decision-maker). The alternatives consist 
of the possible grounds upon which the judicial decision-maker can resolve 
the case before it. 
The parties play a critical role in shaping the agenda. At the simplest 
level, if parties fail to bring a case, there is nothing for a court to decide, 
and the “case or controversy” requirement, as well as the general aversion 
to advisory opinions, precludes judges from opining on a matter.45 Even 
when a case or controversy has commenced, parties still enjoy a fair bit of 
control over the setting of the decisional agenda. They do so both through 
the arguments they raise and those they do not. For example, if I am in-
jured in an accident, I may frame the claim either as a negligence claim or 
a strict liability claim. If I opt for the strict liability theory, then I effec-
tively deprive the court of the ability to opine on negligence law in the 
context of my case. Conversely, the defendant in my case may shape the 
issues through the defenses that she raises. By challenging personal juris-
diction, she creates the opportunity for the court to opine on the matter. If 
she declines to do so, waiver rules may preclude the court from addressing 
the issue. 
561, 590 (1977) (explaining how, under a “closed rule” in the House, bill amendments could “be 
profoundly affected by the order in which amendments are presented and by the order in which the 
legislation in question is taken up relative to other matters to be considered by the House”). 
 42. See KINGDON, supra note 41, at 3. 
 43. See generally id.  
44. See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 16–17 (1991). 
 45. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911); Case of 
Hayburn, 2 U.S. 408, 410 (1792). 
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Yet party control over a court’s decision agenda is not absolute. Some-
times, doctrines constrain the agenda despite the party’s choice. Ripeness 
and mootness rules, as well as the general bar against advisory opinions, 
preclude courts from addressing issues even when the parties mutually 
desire for them to do so.46 Other times, doctrines can put issues on the 
agenda even where the parties would prefer otherwise. The most obvious 
example is the requirement of subject-matter jurisdiction, which a court 
may raise at any time.47 More broadly, any doctrine that a court may raise 
sua sponte creates the potential for issues to enter the agenda regardless of 
the parties’ preferences or whether they have waived the issue.48
While parties may control what goes on the agenda, courts enjoy 
greater control over the choice of alternatives. Consider again the example 
given at the front of this paper. A defendant may move to dismiss a case 
on multiple grounds—lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal 
jurisdiction, improper venue, improper service, comity, and political ques-
tion. Yet once the defendant has filed the motion, he is generally power-
less to influence the order in which the court addresses those grounds. 
Sometimes that matter will be left entirely to the court’s discretion (flexi-
ble sequencing rules). Other times, legal rules—whether judicially created 
or legislatively created—will constrain the court’s exercise of that discre-
tion (rigid sequencing rules). 
Though judicial decision-making bears some of the features of King-
don’s legislative model, it is important to emphasize some critical differ-
ences. For one thing, in contrast to lawmakers’ legislative decision-
making, the decision-makers in judicial decision-making (the court or the 
arbitrator) have virtually no power to set the agenda—whereas lawmakers 
can decide what bills to introduce, courts depend on parties to bring cases 
or controversies invoking their jurisdiction.49 For another thing, in judicial 
 46. Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964) (mootness); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 
U.S. 312, 316 (1974) (mootness); Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967) (ripeness); 
Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 356–60 (advisory opinions). 
 47. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h); Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506–07 (2006). 
 48. Contrary to some readers’ expectations, subject-matter jurisdiction is not the only issue that a 
court may raise sua sponte. Judicial practice is replete with examples of judges raising a host of other 
issues on their own initiative. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629–33 (1962) 
(permitting sua sponte dismissal for failure to prosecute under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)). 
See generally Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an 
Opportunity to be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253, 1279–81 (2002). 
 49. KINGDON, supra note 41, at 20, 37. I include the slight qualifier because in at least two re-
spects courts can influence the agenda, at least indirectly. First, judges sometimes expressly encourage 
parties to file a certain kind of case or make a certain kind of argument. Examples include dissents 
from denials of certiorari and separate opinions in which the judge notes that no party raised a certain 
argument but indicating how the judge would rule if the party did. Second, courts sometimes indirectly 
signal that interest through noting how they might reach a different result in a case presenting a differ-
ent set of facts. The specification of that set of facts indirectly at least invites parties to present that 
second case.  
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decision-making, the “participants”50 most responsible for setting the 
judge’s agenda (i.e., the parties) have the least influence in how a court 
chooses among the alternatives. By contrast, in legislative decision-
making, at least some of the entities responsible for setting the agenda also 
can influence selection among the alternatives.51 Finally, whereas in legis-
lative decision-making the rules that influence choices among alternatives 
(e.g., committee structures, supermajority requirements, etc.) are always 
subject to revision by the decision-maker—Congress can always change 
the rule—the same property does not hold true for judicial decision-
making. To the extent statutes constrain judicial choices, courts will be 
bound to observe them. To the extent caselaw supplies a doctrine con-
straining judicial discretion, stare decisis principles may bind courts to 
apply that doctrine.52
3. Path Dependence 
Path dependence theory, pioneered by Paul David,53 rests on the no-
tion that current circumstances are contingent on historical decisions, 
sometimes quite accidentally.54 In the classic example, explorers come to 
an uncharted forest. They cut a particular path through the forest. That 
decision, which may have been the product of deliberate reflection or a 
complete accident, will then influence the route that future travelers will 
follow. For efficiency, cost-saving, and other reasons, they naturally will 
be inclined to follow the path cleared by their predecessors. This depen-
dence on the preexisting path will endure even after it might be demon-
strated that a different route through the forest would be more efficient. 
Another familiar example is the QWERTY keyboard.55 Those of us who 
know how to type learned how to do so on such a keyboard (or, decrea-
singly so, typewriter). Even if it could be shown that other keyboard 
 50. KINGDON, supra note 41, at 16, 20, 23–24. 
 51. Here, one might draw a slightly more sophisticated parallel to Kingdon’s treatment of agenda 
setting and alternative selection. Kingdon notes that while the President represents the single most 
influential force in agenda setting, he has far less clout in influencing congressional choice among 
alternatives, that prerogative belonging more closely to Congress. See KINGDON, supra note 41, at 26–
27. 
 52. See, e.g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982). 
 53. See Paul A. David, Clio and the economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS &
PROC.) 332 (1985). 
 54. For exemplary literature, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehn-
quist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 434 nn. 22–23 (2002); Mark J. Roe, 
Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1996); Oona A. Hathaway, 
Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 
IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001); Julie C. Suk, Procedural Path Dependence: Discrimination and the Civil-
Criminal Divide, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1315 (2008); S.J. Liebowitz, Path Dependence, Lock-in and 
History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995); Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 802, 817–21 (1982). 
 55. See id.
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layouts would be more efficient (or less destructive on one’s joints), socie-
ty may be slow to accept any new keyboard layout, trained as we are by 
the keyboard on which we learned. 
Can path dependence theory illuminate how we should think about the 
design of sequencing rules? To a point. Path dependence theory teaches us 
to be cognizant of the impact of the first time a court makes a discretio-
nary choice about the order in which to resolve the issues before her. The 
analysis may cut two ways. On the one hand, a flexible sequencing rule 
(such as Sinochem) might reduce path-dependent behavior by reducing the 
costs to the judge of following different paths depending on the complexity 
of the issues before her. On the other hand, a flexible sequencing rule 
might actually encourage path-dependent behavior to the extent it encou-
rages judges to develop explicit or implicit biases about the order in which 
they resolve cases that present multiple dispositive issues. Whichever ac-
count is correct, path dependence theory teaches us about the conse-
quences of our choice architecture for efficient outcomes. 
Yet path dependence theory, like the others discussed above, does not 
tell a complete story. It does not fully help us determine how best to de-
sign the choice architecture in order to achieve the most efficient outcome 
(or at least to reduce embedded inefficiencies). Nor does path dependence 
theory supply an adequate account of how other values beyond efficien-
cy—like the parties’ settlement incentives or the development of 
precedent—should factor into the choice architecture. 
Summing up, so far I have shown that the order in which courts re-
solve matters—both as individual courts and across layers of the judi-
ciary—has significant and underappreciated outcomes on party behavior 
and development of the law. Decisional sequencing supplies a lens that 
helps us to think systematically about those issues. At a conceptual level, 
the theory underpinning decisional sequencing is informed by other theo-
ries that focus on choice—cycling majorities, agenda setting, and path de-
pendence. None of these analogies, however, is airtight, so it becomes 
important to build on the lessons of those preexisting theories. The next 
Subpart turns to that task. 
C. Integrating the Theories, With Thanks to Sonja West56
If none of the foregoing theories supplies sufficient tools to think sys-
tematically about decisional sequencing, where should we turn? To begin 
to construct a fully functioning model, it is worth noting a potentially im-
portant distinction between decisional sequencing and matters that the 
 56. During an early presentation of these ideas at the University of Georgia Law School’s “half-
baked lunch” colloquium series, my colleague Sonja West raised the good question that I seek to 
address here. 
2010] Decisional Sequencing 21 
prior theories touched upon—a perspicacious insight that a colleague 
raised during an earlier presentation on this project. Issues like voting 
cycles and legislative decision-making involve expressions of preference. 
By contrast, judicial decision-making (in theory at least) does not. Instead, 
it only involves (or should only involve) the derivation and application of 
fixed rules to a particular factual setting. Such decision-making does not 
(or at least should not) entail expression of the judge’s preferences or alter 
the outcomes of cases. While this distinction is valid, decisional sequenc-
ing rules are important in at least four different ways. 
First, decisional sequencing rules can influence a judge’s preference 
over how to resolve a case.57 Consider the example of a constitutional 
challenge to a municipal ordinance on the ground that the ordinance vi-
olates the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. If the judge con-
cludes that the ordinance violates the First Amendment (but not the other 
two), she might write a narrow opinion that simply addresses the First 
Amendment issues (relegating the others to a footnote), or she might write 
a broader opinion explicitly rejecting the two grounds of challenge but 
accepting the third.58 Presently, no doctrine constrains the judge’s discre-
tion to choose between these two types of opinions. Yet one could easily 
imagine another rule under which judges would be obligated only to ad-
dress the dispositive issue in a case (and not others).59 That latter sequenc-
ing rule would constrain the judge’s preference to write a sweeping opi-
nion instead of a narrow one.  
Second, decisional sequencing rules can influence the parties’ settle-
ment incentives. Consider, for example, a case where a defendant seeks to 
dismiss a case on grounds of both lack of personal jurisdiction and forum 
non conveniens. If a court must decide the jurisdictional defense before 
deciding the nonjurisdictional one, that rule might be unfavorable to de-
fendants.60 Even if the defendants have an airtight case on forum non con-
veniens, they might settle rather than risk an adverse finding on personal 
 57. See Michael E. Levine & Charles R. Plott, Agenda Influence and its Implications, 63 VA. L.
REV. 561, 565 (1977) (noting that the “agenda determines the set of strategies available to the individ-
ual”). 
 58. See, e.g., Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (1999) (dismissing case on six 
independent grounds). The judge’s choice of approach might depend on protecting her judgment from 
reversal on appeal.  
 59. Although not a strict requirement, the interpretive doctrine of constitutional avoidance is one 
such rule in that it favors deciding a case without reaching constitutional issues. See Edward J. DeBar-
tolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (“[W]here an 
otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court 
will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the 
intent of Congress.”). 
 60. The district court in Sinochem recognized precisely these stakes in the case. By dismissing the 
case on forum non conveniens grounds, it deprived the plaintiffs of the opportunity to take jurisdic-
tional discovery (and spared the defendants the attendant costs). See Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp. 
Berhad v. Sinochem Int’l Co., No. Civ.A. 03-3771, 2004 WL 503541 at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2004).
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jurisdiction that could be used against them in subsequent litigation.61 By 
contrast, if a court can dismiss the case on forum non conveniens grounds 
without having to address the jurisdictional issue, that rule is far more 
favorable to defendants—they can get rid of the case without first facing 
an adverse decision on the jurisdictional issue.62
Third, decisional sequencing rules influence the outcome of the case 
currently before the court (or arbitrator). Consider, for example, a case in 
which a defendant has substantial contacts with a forum, yet those contacts 
are unknown to the plaintiff. The outcome of the case may depend critical-
ly on whether some amount of jurisdictional discovery can precede a de-
termination of whether to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.63 If ju-
risdictional discovery is allowed, the plaintiff can learn of the defendant’s 
contacts and, thereby, can strengthen its case for personal jurisdiction. If, 
however, the converse rule applied—that no discovery could precede a 
finding of jurisdiction—then plaintiffs would be less likely to prevail. Suits 
likely would be dismissed more often—it would complicate plaintiffs’ abil-
ities to establish personal jurisdiction. In this respect, a sequencing rule 
directly influences the outcome of the case before the court.64
Fourth, decisional sequencing rules can influence the outcomes of fu-
ture cases. Consider again the evolution of the sequencing rules governing 
qualified immunity determinations. If a court must first decide whether a 
constitutional right exists, its opinion will influence decisions in later cases 
about whether a right was “clearly established.” By contrast, if a court can 
resolve the case on grounds of whether the right was “clearly established” 
(without having to determine whether the right exists at all), then it will be 
 61. While the first opinion probably cannot be used under principles of offensive, nonmutual 
collateral estoppel, see, e.g., Davis v. Metro Prod., Inc., 885 F.2d 515, 519 (9th Cir. 1989), the 
defendants’ contacts with the forum are still the subject of a potentially publishable opinion. To the 
extent the court utilizes a nationwide contacts test envisioned under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
4(k)(1)(D) or 4(k)(2), this could subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction in any federal court 
throughout the United States. 
 62. The effects here are especially profound in federal cases against foreign defendants. Under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(b) and 4(k)(2), a court may in some instances apply a nation-
wide contacts test to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with the Consti-
tution. A finding that the defendant satisfies this test under a general jurisdiction theory thereby could 
render it potentially subject to suit anywhere in the United States (provided that the case involves a 
federal cause of action). See Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 364 F.3d 646, 650–51 (5th 
Cir. 2004). 
 63. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 30, at 992–93. 
 64. Transjurisdictional sequencing rules also influence outcomes. Suppose that parties to a con-
tract have competing claims. The buyer claims that the seller has supplied nonconforming goods; the 
seller claims that buyer has failed to pay the purchase price. Each party has its preferred forum (buyer 
in buyers’ country, seller in seller’s country). Under those circumstances, a rule under which a court 
in one country would stay its action pending a decision in the other forum could easily affect the out-
come, whether due to the added costs to one party of litigating in the foreign forum or differences in 
procedural or substantive rules of the preferred forum that favor one party. 
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relatively harder for plaintiffs in subsequent cases to establish that a de-
fendant is not entitled to qualified immunity.65
Taking into account the unique features of decisional sequencing and 
its overlap with the broader literature on decisional theory, we can begin 
to discern several values that should animate a theoretical construct of 
decisional sequencing rules. One critical value that cuts across all forms of 
decisional sequencing rules is the investment of judicial resources. By this, 
I mean the amount of time that a judicial actor must invest mastering the 
facts and law in a case. Rigid sequencing rules increase the required in-
vestment by first-order decision-makers. For example, a rule like Steel 
Co. requires district judges to undertake potentially difficult jurisdictional 
inquiries even when an easier merits-based ground exists for dismissing a 
case. Similarly, the final judgment rule requires district judges to invest 
more heavily in a case even when immediate correction of a legal error 
(such as reversal of an order denying a motion to dismiss) might reduce 
that investment. 
By contrast, flexible sequencing rules can reduce these demands on the 
first-order decision-maker, sometimes reallocating it to others. For exam-
ple, the Cohen doctrine entails the opposite effect of the final judgment 
rule. It enables a first-order decision-maker to suspend her investment of 
resources in a case (for example, following a denial of qualified immuni-
ty); meanwhile, a reviewing court must undertake a greater investment of 
resources to review the decision (an investment that would be unnecessary 
under an exceptionless final judgment rule). Similarly, a flexible transju-
risdictional rule (such as a discretionary rule regarding the issuance of lis 
pendens stays) allows a court in one jurisdiction to reduce its investment in 
a case by allowing a decision-maker in another jurisdiction to resolve the 
case first.  
A second value, cutting across all forms of decisional sequencing 
rules, is the effect of such rules on the parties’ settlement incentives. Gen-
erally, it would appear that rigid sequencing rules tend to favor plaintiffs. 
In the context of horizontal sequencing, rigid rules may force defendants 
to endure losses on particular grounds where their defense may be weak, 
even if a stronger ground may exist further down the decisional pathway. 
In the vertical and transjurisdicitonal context, rigid rules prevent defen-
dants from seeking immediate relief in alternative forums (whether appel-
late or entirely different jurisdictions) that might be more sympathetic to 
their position. In essence, rigid rules help to entrench the plaintiff’s first-
mover advantage.66 More flexible sequencing rules (such as immediate 
 65. See supra note 14. For a good example of how the sequencing influences the qualified immun-
ity inquiry, see Jean v. Collins, 155 F.3d 701 (4th Cir. 1998), vacated, 526 U.S. 1142 (1999). 
 66. For a survey on the first-mover advantage, see generally Marvin B. Lieberman & David B. 
Montgomery, First-Mover Advantages, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 41 (1988). 
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appealability or a more relaxed standard on lis pendens stays) offset these 
advantages and favor defendants in the settlement bargain. 
A third critical value is the development of precedent. Rigid sequenc-
ing rules distort precedent development. They favor the development of 
precedent in certain areas (namely those that come first on the decisional 
agenda) while reducing the production of precedent on topics further down 
the decisional agenda. Likewise, flexible vertical sequencing rules—such 
as those that permit immediate appealability of certain orders—facilitate 
the development of appellate precedent on those appealable issues; by con-
trast, issues that must await final judgment before an appellate tribunal can 
consider them are less likely to generate as much appellate precedent. 
Synthesizing the foregoing discussion, we can observe that decisional 
sequencing rules have a meaningful effect on outcomes, both in terms of 
the actual matter before the court and on future matters. Sequencing rules, 
whether horizontal, vertical, or transjurisdictional, also implicate a com-
mon set of values—the investment of judicial resources, the parties’ set-
tlement incentives, and the production of precedent. Recognizing these 
values enables both positive and normative analysis. On the positive level, 
these metrics enable us to assess how a particular rule affects the values 
and how it balances them to the extent the values may cut in opposite di-
rections—Part II and Part III address this. On a normative level, these 
metrics facilitate a critical discussion about the desirable sequencing rule 
in a given context—Part IV addresses this.
II. SIMPLE MODEL
This section systematizes the ideas developed in Part I. Using the ty-
pology developed in Part I.A, it explains as a positive matter how different 
sorts of sequencing rules—horizontal, vertical, and transjurisdictional—
map out along the values described in Part I.C. 
A. Horizontal Rules 
Recall that horizontal sequencing rules (such as the Steel Company-
Ruhrgas-Sinochem trilogy) determine the order in which a single decision-
maker—a judge, an appellate court, or an arbitrator—resolves issues. 
Viewed against the matrix developed in Part I.C, horizontal rules exert 
moderate influences on both the investment of resources by courts and on 
the development of precedent. Their most profound effect, however, is on 
the parties’ settlement incentives. 
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1. Resource Investment 
Horizontal sequencing rules can impose greater search costs on courts, 
requiring them to invest more time and resources to resolve a case. Steel 
Co. provides the most obvious example—by requiring courts to determine 
jurisdiction before considering merits-based defenses, the Steel Co. rule 
forces courts to work through thorny jurisdictional issues before turning to 
merits issues that may be potentially quite easier. One might argue that 
this search cost is justified on the ground that it imposes a restraining ef-
fect on courts—allowing them to opine on the meaning of the law only 
when they have cleared any jurisdictional hurdles.67 Yet other horizontal 
sequencing rules work the same drain on resources without the same ap-
parently comparable effect. 
2. Law Development 
Horizontal sequencing rules affect the content of the law.68 By forcing 
courts to resolve certain questions before others, horizontal sequencing 
rules enhance the likelihood that courts will render more decisions in the 
former area than the latter. Consequently, such rules effectively “make” 
more law in those areas that are given priority under any decisional se-
quence while retarding the development of law in those areas on which 
courts can render opinions only after deciding the “prior” matters. Of 
course, this does not necessarily mean that a world with decisional se-
quencing rules is more likely to skew the development of the law than a 
world without them. A more flexible sequencing rule might likewise skew 
the development of the law. For example, if certain inquiries were particu-
larly straightforward, a court inclined to preserve scarce resources of time 
might otherwise drift toward resolving cases on those “straightforward” 
grounds (such as some jurisdictional hook) while consistently avoiding 
others (such as whether a complaint states a claim). 
While horizontal sequencing rules skew the production of the law, it 
does not necessarily follow that they reduce the total amount of law pro-
duction.69 A judge willing to invest more resources might well conclude 
 67. See David L. Shapiro, Justice Ginsburg’s First Decade: Some Thoughts About Her Contribu-
tions in the Fields of Procedure and Jurisdiction, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 21, 29–31 (2004). 
 68. See John C. Jeffries, Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2010 SUP. CT.
REV. 115, 120 (2010); Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical 
Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667 (2009); Paul W. Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: Wilson-Saucier 
Sequencing and the Articulation of Constitutional Rights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 401 (2009); Bruce 
Chapman, Law, Incommensurability, and Conceptually Sequenced Argument, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
1487, 1506 (1998). 
 69. Heather Elliott has observed that horizontal sequencing rules like Ruhrgas and Sinochem are 
best understood to reflect a philosophy of judicial restraint insofar as it “permits a court . . . to avoid 
treading on the bounadary of its power, when it would lack juruisdiction for another threshold rea-
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that he or she should dismiss a case on jurisdictional grounds and then go 
on and offer an alternative ground for dismissal.70 As a consequence of a 
sequencing rule like Steel Company, though, the judge cannot begin to 
articulate a view on the latter, alternative issue before resolving the for-
mer. Consequently, with respect to law production, horizontal sequencing 
rules at bottom have the effect of leading to overproduction of laws in the 
area that enjoys priority in the sequencing scheme and may, depending on 
the judge’s preferences, lead to underproduction in areas of law that are 
further down the decisional scheme. 
3. Parties’ Behavior 
Perhaps the most powerful effect of a sequencing rule is on the defen-
dant’s behavior. Specifically, sequencing rules influence a defendant’s 
choices over what defenses to raise in a dispositive motion. In light of the 
strict waiver provisions of Federal Rule 12(h),71 a sequencing rule requir-
ing district courts to resolve jurisdictional objections before turning to 
non-jurisdictional ones might create a conundrum for defendants. If they 
raise a jurisdictional objection and a venue objection, they run the risk that 
a court will have to reject a weak jurisdictional defense before ultimately 
dismissing the case on the venue ground (thereby resulting in a finding 
that jurisdiction exists). By contrast, under a more discretionary sequenc-
ing system (such as that created by Sinochem), defendants can include 
more defenses in their dispositive motions without fear that a judge will 
rule adversely as to one before ultimately resolving the case in the defen-
dant’s favor on other grounds. 
Of course, even under a more flexible rule, such as that permitted by 
Sinochem, the defendant raising multiple defenses still runs risks. Sino-
chem does not preclude the judge from resolving any non-merits defenses 
in whatever order she chooses. Consequently, a judge, particularly one 
disposed against a defendant and willing to invest the intellectual resources 
to resolve multiple issues, might well reject several of the defendant’s de-
fenses in a reported opinion before ultimately resolving the case in the 
defendant’s favor. 
There is, however, an important difference between the two cases. In 
a rigid sequencing world, the judge’s adverse decision on the jurisdictional 
matter is technically a holding—since it was a logically necessary anterior 
premise to reaching the non-jurisdictional ground. By contrast, under a 
son.” Elliott supra note 6, at 743. While I agree with Elliott that flexible sequencing rules have that 
restraining effect, the flipside consequence is that they encourage law production in more areas of law 
than if a court were forced to a follow a strict horizontal sequencing order (which might result in 
dismissal of the case on a different ground). 
 70. See Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 63–65 (S.D. Tex. 1994). 
 71. FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (h). 
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flexible sequencing rule, any adverse rulings on issues—prior to the favor-
able ruling on the issue that results in dismissal of the case—is arguably 
dicta, since it was not essential to the court’s judgment. Thus, the more 
discretionary the sequencing rule, the greater the flexibility accorded to 
the defendant to argue away adverse rulings, and thus the greater options 
afforded the defendant to raise multiple defenses in a dispositive motion 
without risking an adverse ruling.72
Sequencing rules exert a powerful effect on plaintiffs’ behavior as 
well. To the extent the judge must rule on issues in a particular order, a 
mandatory sequencing rule might work to the plaintiffs’ advantage. Juris-
dictional discovery provides a good example.73 Under a system where the 
judge must determine jurisdiction before considering any other defense, a 
plaintiff has a stronger claim for obtaining jurisdictional discovery (since 
the judge lacks an alternative ground upon which to dismiss the case and 
which preterit might thereby obviate jurisdictional discovery). Once so 
ordered (and the frequency of such orders seems to be rising), this discov-
ery can help the plaintiff obtain valuable information about the defen-
dant.74 Such information can help plaintiffs in various ways. It obviously 
will strengthen the plaintiff’s case on jurisdiction; depending on the nature 
of the case (such as cases against foreign sovereigns where subject-matter 
jurisdiction is tied to discovery), it also might strengthen the case on the 
merits. Finally, such discovery can be of assistance in future cases to the 
 72. The effects of sequencing rules in international civil litigation stand in marked contrast to the 
analogous (and more flexible) rules in international commercial arbitration. While I deal with arbitra-
tion primarily in Part III, a brief comparison here illuminates the point. Unlike civil litigation, arbitra-
tion—due to its greater procedural flexibility—allows arbitrators to pretermit questions on jurisdiction 
pending the submission of pleadings—and a potential hearing—on the merits. Consequently, the parties 
may be required to invest more front-end resources before obtaining a favorable decision on jurisdic-
tion, increasing the settlement leverage on the less well capitalized party. See generally infra Part III. 
Other aspects of arbitration can, however, offset the effect of this settlement leverage. For example, in 
contrast to judges, arbitrators generally enjoy far greater flexibility in their decisions whether to award 
attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party. Consequently, even if the party must invest more upfront re-
sources in order to obtain a favorable ruling, the procedural flexibility afforded to arbitrators enhances 
the likelihood that the party can recoup some of those costs. The greater restrictions on fee awards, at 
least under the American rule, increases the likelihood that increased costs caused by sequencing rules 
will be unrecoverable. 
 73. For an excellent discussion of jurisdictional discovery and its broader implications for federal 
practice, see S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal Courts, 67 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 489 (2010). 
 74. The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed issues of jurisdictional discovery, apart from 
approving a sanction for a party’s failure to comply with a jurisdictional discovery order. See Ins. 
Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1984). This lack of guidance 
has sparked a nasty disagreement among the federal courts of appeals over the availability of jurisdic-
tional discovery. Compare In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 288, 301–305 (3d. 
Cir. 2004) (summarizing disagreement about whether jurisdictional discovery must proceed under the 
Hague Evidence Convention and declining to require resort to the Convention for jurisdictional dis-
covery), with Geo-Culture, Inc. v. Siam Inv. Mgmt. S.A., 936 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Or. App. 1997) 
(requiring resort to Convention for jurisdictional discovery where plaintiff did not make prima facie 
showing of personal jurisdiction). For commentary, see BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 30, at 992–
93. 
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extent it reveals information about a defendant’s activities that might help 
in those cases. 
The effect of horizontal sequencing rules such as jurisdictional discov-
ery can be especially significant in certain cases where the jurisdictional 
discovery closely overlaps with the merits of the dispute.75 Consider, for 
example, cases against foreign states. The FSIA, which governs the im-
munity of foreign states, sets forth a presumption of immunity followed by 
a series of exceptions.76 Several of the exceptions, though technically func-
tioning as exceptions to the general rule of immunity, turn on issues that 
touch upon issues of substantive liability.77 These include, for example, 
the nature of an expropriation, the nature of a tort, or whether a foreign 
official was acting within the scope of employment. Consequently, plain-
tiffs seeking jurisdictional discovery from a foreign sovereign can poten-
tially frame those discovery requests in a manner designed to gain infor-
mation helpful to their proof on the substance of their claims—even before 
the Court has ruled on whether it has jurisdiction.78 To the extent a juris-
diction permits jurisdictional discovery before deciding whether to dismiss 
a case on the pleadings, such discovery becomes a powerful weapon in the 
plaintiff’s arsenal. 
Jurisdictional veil piercing provides another example where plaintiffs 
can exploit the sequencing created by jurisdictional discovery rules.79 Ju-
risdictional veil piercing enables plaintiffs to assert personal jurisdiction 
over a nonresident defendant based on the contacts of a subsidiary or agent 
(in the typical scenario, it is a related company).80 Such jurisdictional veil 
piercing doctrines may differ in some respects from the more familiar 
substantive veil piercing rules from corporate law. Yet there is enough 
overlap between the two inquiries that allows a plaintiff, seeking to impute 
jurisdictional contacts, to elicit information about the relationship between 
corporate parties that helps it prove its case on the merits. Such discovery, 
again, even before the court rules on the pleadings, enhances a plaintiff’s 
settlement leverage, both with respect to the costs of compliance and with 
respect to influencing the defendant’s decision whether it wishes to dis-
close potentially incriminating information about its intercorporate activi-
ties that might be used in later cases.  
 75. Other examples include whether a federal officer was under “color of office” under the feder-
al officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (2006), and the “law of nations” requirement under the 
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).  
 76. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 30, at 222–23. 
 77. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2006). 
 78. See Maureen P. Smith, Jurisdictional Discovery in Cases Under the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act 11–18 (unpublished manuscript) (2007) (on file with author). 
 79. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 30, at 164–92. 
 80. In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 909, 916 (S.D. Ohio 1997), rev’d on other 
grounds, 221 F.3d 870 (6th Cir. 2000). 
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Tying together the two preceding ideas, we can see how horizontal se-
quencing rules exert a profound effect on settlement. Flexible sequencing 
rules strengthen a defendant’s position in settlement because the defendant 
has more avenues available to it for immediate dismissal with a lower risk 
of an adverse ruling. By contrast, rigid sequencing rules strengthen a 
plaintiff’s position in settlement because the mandatory sequence enables 
the plaintiff to obtain a favorable ruling on an early issue, and depending 
on the availability of jurisdictional discovery, drive up the defendant’s 
costs early in the dispute. 
B. Vertical Rules 
Recall that vertical sequencing rules (such as the final judgment rule 
and the collateral order doctrine) determine the timing in which a review-
ing authority (such as an appellate court) may consider the decisions of a 
first-order decision-maker. Viewed against the matrix developed in Part 
I.C, vertical rules exert significant effects on the investment of judicial 
resources, precedent development, and the parties’ settlement incentives. 
1. Resource Investment 
Vertical sequencing rules have several effects on judicial investment of 
resources. Vertical sequencing rules reduce the investment of judicial re-
sources required by first-order decision-makers and reallocate some of the 
required investment to appellate bodies. For example, the immediate ap-
pealability of a denial of sovereign immunity (or official immunity) can 
effectively suspend proceedings in the district court while an appellate 
court considers the issues.81 In the event that the appellate court concludes 
that the denial of immunity was erroneous, the immediate appealability of 
that ruling corrects the district court’s error without the need for further 
investment by the district court. By contrast, if such denials of immunity 
were only immediately appealable following final judgment, the invest-
ment of resources by the district court would be far greater, while the in-
vestment by the appellate court far smaller. 
Various procedural devices help to moderate these effects on resource 
allocation. Sometimes, those procedural devices operate as mandatory 
vertical sequencing rules. These include statutory requirements of imme-
diate appealability (for example in cases of denials of petitions to compel 
arbitration) or decisional requirements under the Cohen rule (such as cer-
tain denials of qualified immunity).82 In other cases, those procedural de-
 81. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985). 
 82. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 16 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2006); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800 (1982); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
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vices operate as discretionary vehicles; certification under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54(b) provides a good example.83 Certification to the Su-
preme Court, a rarely employed but still available tool, provides another.84
The allocation of resources wrought by vertical sequencing rules can 
influence the development of judicial expertise. Consider, for example, the 
rule barring appellate review of district court remand orders in removal 
cases.85 Such a rule naturally encourages specialization in removability 
determinations by district courts while constricting such specialization 
among appellate courts. Instead, appellate courts typically only see cases 
where removal was allowed and later challenged, or less frequently, re-
quests for attorneys’ fees and costs. Likewise, the different sequencing 
rules regarding the immediate appealability of refusals to enforce arbitra-
tion clauses and forum selection clauses influence the sorts of cases that 
appellate courts will encounter. Generally speaking, appellate courts will 
encounter more cases involving arbitration clauses than forum selection 
clauses in light of the easier appealability of orders on these issues, and to 
the extent they encounter forum selection clauses, generally only will do 
so after a case has reached final judgment.86
These reallocations of judicial resources reflect important policy inter-
ests of the forum state. Sovereign immunity rules provide a good example. 
Denials of sovereign immunity, much like denials of official immunity in 
garden variety constitutional tort cases, are immediately appealable.87 That 
result makes sense in light of the purposes of these immunities, namely, 
not merely to protect the defendant from liability, but additionally to pro-
tect the defendant from the hassles of litigation altogether. That additional 
value is frustrated if a defendant must endure an adverse ruling through 
the course of a trial even if the adverse ruling ultimately is corrected on 
appeal. 
2. Law Development 
Vertical sequencing rules influence the development of precedent in 
two ways. First, flexible rules permit more immediate access to higher-
level tribunals, and thereby increase law production. Allowing unresolved 
questions of law to reach appellate tribunals more quickly makes it easier 
for those tribunals to render decisions on those questions. By contrast, 
rigid rules that make it more difficult to obtain a decision by a higher tri-
 83. FED. R. CIV. P. 54 (b). 
 84. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (2006); United States v. Seale, 130 S. Ct. 12 (2009) (respecting the 
dismissal of the certified question). 
 85. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2006). 
 86. 9 U.S.C. § 16 (2006). See also Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 498 (1989). 
 87. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11 (2006) (granting immunity to “Foreign States” unless one of 
several exceptions applies); Harlow, 457 U.S. 800. 
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bunal increase the risk that the case will be disposed of—either through 
settlement or resolution on some other ground—before the appellate tri-
bunal can weigh in on the matter. 
Second, vertical sequencing rules that provide more immediate access 
to higher tribunals also, arguably, increase accurate outcomes. Suppose 
that a district judge is confronted with an issue—such as the enforceability 
of a forum selection clause—and suppose further that the district judge 
resolves the matter incorrectly. If the district judge’s opinion on the matter 
is immediately appealable, then the higher authority can fix the error—
both to the benefit of the individual litigant and to the benefit of future 
litigants who will know the correct legal rule. By contrast, if the district 
judge’s erroneous resolution of the matter is not immediately appealable, 
then there is a greater likelihood, again, that the error will linger—both for 
the remaining life of the case and for future litigants until an appellate 
body is given an opportunity to correct the erroneous premise on which 
the decision rests. 
3. Parties’ Behavior 
Immediate appeal of an adverse decision, as a doctrine like the colla-
teral order allows, enables the party adversely affected by that decision to 
obtain a result more cheaply and more quickly than if the party must await 
final judgment. Consider forum-selection clauses where the Supreme 
Court held in Lauro Lines v. Chasser that refusals to enforce such clauses 
are not immediately appealable.88 If Chasser is right that refusals to en-
force forum-selection clauses are not immediately appealable, then parties 
seeking to vindicate those clauses must (absent an escape hatch such as 
mandamus) either endure the cost of an entire trial or, alternatively, settle 
the case to avoid such an outcome.89
Of course, the cost argument cuts both ways. While vertical sequenc-
ing rules that force a dissatisfied party to await final judgment might favor 
the plaintiff, more liberal vertical sequencing rules (that is, those which 
facilitate immediate appeal) might well favor the defendant in settlement.90
 88. Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. at 501. 
 89. Arbitration again provides a useful contrast. Refusals to enforce arbitration clauses are imme-
diately appealable. 9 U.S.C. § 16 (2006). The opposite sequencing rule regarding the enforceability of 
arbitration clauses enables parties seeking to enforce those clauses to obtain the desired relief more 
quickly and reduces the settlement pressures that they might otherwise feel if forced to litigate a case 
before it can raise the enforceability of the arbitration clause on direct review. I discuss this contrast in 
greater detail below. See infra Part III. 
 90. Occasionally, rigid vertical sequencing rules can favor defendants. If a district court erro-
neously denies some, but not all, of a plaintiff’s claims, the plaintiff may be forced to continue to 
litigate the case to judgment before she can obtain review of the adverse (and erroneous) partial dis-
missal of her claims. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) can be understood as a counterweight to 
that risk. 
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This is because a defendant can use those liberal sequencing rules to in-
crease the process costs for the plaintiff each time the defendant “takes an 
issue up.” Even if the plaintiff ultimately prevails on those appealed is-
sues, she must absorb the cost of litigating them immediately before the 
higher tribunal—costs that she can avoid if the defendant must await final 
judgment before appealing the ruling. 
C. Transjurisdictional Rules 
Recall that transjurisdictional sequencing rules channel disputes in pa-
rallel litigation. By parallel litigation, I mean the common phenomenon in 
dispute resolution, particularly international dispute resolution, where par-
ties have claims against each other, and each party files its claims in its 
preferred forum.91 As with horizontal and vertical sequencing rules, such 
transjurisdictional sequencing rules influence law development, judicial 
behavior, and the parties’ incentives.92
1. Resource Investment 
Transjurisdictional sequencing rules can influence judicial investment 
of resources. The forum non conveniens doctrine represents a type of flex-
ible transjurisdictional rule that reduces a court’s investment of resources. 
Under that doctrine, a court will dismiss a case in favor of an adequate 
foreign forum where a mix of public and private interest factors favors 
dismissal.93 Dismissal on these grounds reduces the court’s investment of 
resources and reallocates the burden in favor of the foreign forum. 
Some rules can offset the allocation effected by the forum non conve-
niens doctrine and inject rigidity into the jurisdictional sequencing. For 
example, some countries have enacted statutes that bar their courts from 
exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over a case previously filed in anoth-
er country.94 Statutes of this sort effectively prevent the foreign forum 
from being considered “adequate” under forum non conveniens doctrine. 
Thereby, they enhance the likelihood that the original forum will retain the 
case and consequently invest resources in resolving it. Another example 
 91. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 30, at 521–60. 
 92. See Nash, supra note 22, at 1883. 
 93. See Piper Aircraft v. Reyno Co., 454 U.S. 235 (1981). See generally BORN & RUTLEDGE,
supra note 30, at 347–434. 
 94. See, e.g., Ley Interpretiva de los artículos 27, 28, 29 y 30 del Código de Procedimiento Civil 
para los casos de Competencia Concurrente Internacional [Interpretive Law for articles 27, 28, 29 and 
30 of the Code of Civil Procedure for cases of Concurrent International Jurisdiction], R.O. No. 247 
(Jan. 30, 1998) (Ecuador) [hereinafter Ley 55] (terminating national competency and jurisdiction of 
Ecuadorian judges over lawsuits filed outside Ecuadorian territory). The Ecuadorian Constitutional 
Court declared Ley 55 unconstitutional in 2002. Aguinda v. Texaco, 303 F.3d 470, 477 (2d Cir. 
2002). 
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comes from the Hague Choice of Courts Convention which precludes 
courts designated in forum-selection clauses from dismissing cases under 
the forum non conveniens doctrine.95 Both examples operate similar to 
rigid horizontal sequencing rules like Steel Company insofar as they in-
crease the resource investment of the first-instance tribunal. 
Clawback statutes have similar effects. Those statutes, enacted by the 
United Kingdom in response to aggressive assertions of jurisdiction by 
United States courts, authorized causes of action to recover from United 
States plaintiffs who had recovered from British defendants under the 
treble damages provisions of United States antitrust laws.96 The effect of 
these statutes is to discourage courts in the first forum, the United States, 
from exercising jurisdiction—or, put more directly, to discourage parties 
from invoking the jurisdiction of United States’ courts—in order to avoid a 
subsequent action in a United Kingdom court. 
Transjurisdictional sequencing rules also can influence judicial beha-
vior once a court (or arbitral tribunal) has a case. A rule that encourages 
parallel litigation—such as one that disfavors the issuance of a stay lis alibi 
pendens or an antisuit injunction—encourages a race to judgment. The 
entire premise of this conservative approach to such forum channeling 
devices is that courts should tolerate parallel litigation until the first case 
proceeds to judgment; at that point, the judgment rendered in that forum 
can be recognized in the other forum under principles of res judicata.97
This gives each court in parallel litigation an incentive to proceed quick-
ly—particularly as it invests more time and resources in a case. If it fails 
to render the first judgment, then recognition of the other forum’s judg-
ment may mean that its efforts have been for naught. By contrast, courts 
more willing to issue stays or antisuit injunctions do not operate under the 
same incentive structure. Since courts employing these devices are more 
willing to make an early determination about the single proper forum for a 
dispute, there is a reduced risk that this forum will be competing with 
another forum in the race to judgment. It can take its time without risk of 
a judgment from a parallel litigation obviating its efforts. 
2. Law Development 
Transjurisdictional sequencing rules critically influence law develop-
ment. Consider, for example, the standards governing the issuance of 
stays lis alibi pendens.98 A liberal standard for issuance of such stays op-
 95. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 30, at 442. 
 96. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 30, at 648–50. 
 97. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND 
MATERIALS 2881–83 (2009). 
 98. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 30, at 521–40. 
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erates like a flexible sequencing rule: it enhances the likelihood that a dis-
pute will be heard in a foreign forum. Consequently, the foreign forum is 
likelier to apply its own law—or at least its own conflicts principles—
whereas the dispute is unlikely to generate any substantive law in the ab-
staining forum, which may ultimately just recognize the foreign judgment, 
once rendered, under its principles of res judicata. By contrast, a stricter 
standard for issuance of such stays operates like a rigid sequencing rule: it 
enhances the likelihood that a dispute will be heard in the plaintiffs’ origi-
nal forum, prompting that forum to apply its own law or conflicts prin-
ciples to the case and thereby generate more domestic precedent. 
3. Parties’ Behavior 
Transjurisdictional sequencing rules have three primary effects on par-
ties’ behavior. First, such rules can effectively deprive parties of access to 
a forum altogether. A foreign statute that precludes subject-matter jurisdic-
tion over a case filed elsewhere, like Ecudorean Ley 55,99 or a treaty pro-
vision that precludes a forum non conveniens dismissal, like the Hague 
Choice of Courts Convention,100 helps to lock in the plaintiff’s first mover 
advantage and enhances the plaintiff’s settlement leverage.101
Second, transjurisdictional rules can increase both parties’ settlement 
incentives. Sequencing rules that favor parallel litigation—such as a con-
servative approach to the issuance of a lis pendens stay—increase the costs 
to litigants who now must litigate in multiple forums rather than have their 
bilateral disputes channeled into a single forum. Such an outcome increas-
es pressure on the financially weaker party to settle the case. By contrast, 
courts more disposed to issuing these remedies channel bilateral disputes 
into a single forum more quickly, which reduces dispute resolution costs 
and thus relieves the more poorly capitalized party of the pressure to settle 
a case quickly. 
Creative sequencing rules can influence these pressures. Consider 
conditional dismissals.102 Often used in the forum non conveniens context, 
conditional dismissals provide that a United States court will dismiss or 
suspend a case but only if the defendant agrees to certain conditions.103
These conditions range from the mundane, such as waivers of jurisdiction-
al objections, to the severe, such as agreeing to be bound by any judg-
 99. See supra note 94. 
100. See supra note 95. 
101. Consider too the European Court of Justice’s recent ruling in Allianz SpA & Generali Assicu-
razioni Generali SpA v. West Tankers Inc., which interpreted EC Regulation 44/2001 to prohibit 
antisuit injunctions even where the parallel litigation violates an arbitration agreement. Case C-185/07, 
Allianz SpA & Generali Assicurazioni Generali SpA v. W. Tankers Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-663, ¶ 28. 
102. See, e.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842, 850 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986), aff’d, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987). 
103. Id.
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ment, to the truly intrusive, like agreeing to apply the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in the foreign forum.104 While the defendant sometimes 
volunteers these conditions (in an effort to procure a favorable dismissal), 
sometimes the court imposes them sua sponte.105 The net effect of such 
conditions is to offset some of the procedural or substantive advantages 
that the defendant obtains through litigation in the foreign forum and, con-
sequently, to increase the plaintiff’s settlement leverage. 
Third, transjurisdictional sequencing rules affect the parties’ behavior 
within the disputes themselves. Rules that favor the issuance of lis pendens 
stays or antisuit injunctions encourage a race to the courthouse, for under 
those regimes the party filing first has an immediate advantage in blocking 
subsequently filed parallel litigation. By contrast, rules that favor parallel 
litigation favor a race to judgment. Even under these more relaxed re-
gimes, the prevailing party in the first favorable judgment can then seek 
recognition of that judgment, thereby precluding further litigation in the 
parallel proceeding. 
Differences across forums regarding the availability of these devices 
can alter party behavior as well. For example, in the United States, the 
current rules regarding the availability of lis pendens stays or antisuit in-
junctions are governed almost entirely by federal common law, generating 
a nasty inter-circuit split over the proper standard for the issuance of such 
devices.106 By contrast, under the American Law Institute’s proposed fed-
eral statute on jurisdiction and judgments, lis pendens stays would be more 
easily obtained.107 To the extent these rules were more favorable than a 
foreign jurisdiction’s rules regarding lis pendens stays, a party favoring 
litigation abroad would be encouraged to file quickly abroad (thereby trig-
gering the statute’s lis pendens rules); by contrast, the party favoring liti-
gation in the United States would be encouraged to file quickly in the 
United States (in an effort to beat its opponent to the courthouse and, the-
reby, preclude triggering the lis pendens provisions). 
The following table summarizes the analytical lessons from the analy-
sis of the decisional sequencing model in its simple form: 
104. See generally Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, Validity and Propriety of Conditions Imposed 
Upon Proceeding in Foreign Forum by Federal Court in Dismissing Action Under Forum Non Conve-
niens, 89 A.L.R. FED. 238 (1988). 
105. See, e.g., Adams v. Merck & Co., 353 F. App’x 960 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
106. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 30, at 521–60. 
107. See A.L.I., RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND 
PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE § 11 (2006). 
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III. REFINED MODEL
To this point, the Article has assumed that decisional sequencing rules 
are mandatory. That is, states set the rules, and parties must play by them. 
These sequencing rules are actually default rules around which the parties, 
within limits, may contract.108 Continuing the analytic matrix developed 
above, this Part considers the impact of this “default” quality of certain 
sequencing rules on the parties’ behavior, the courts’ behavior, and law 
development. 
Before turning to the analysis, it is helpful to note the various ways in 
which parties may attempt to manipulate the decisional sequence. Some 
examples will be quite familiar. For example, both forum-selection clauses 
and arbitration clauses (to the extent they are exclusive) exemplify efforts 
to influence contractually transjurisdictional sequencing rules by specify-
ing ex ante the forum in which all disputes must be resolved.109 Others will 
be more subtle. For example, certain features of arbitration clauses may 
influence vertical sequencing rules by expanding, or contracting, the tim-
ing (and degree) of judicial review. 
A. Contractual Manipulation of Horizontal Rules 
Interim orders on jurisdiction exemplify how parties can, through arbi-
tration, contractually manipulate sequencing rules that otherwise would 
prevail in litigation. Recall that, under Steel Company, a court cannot dis-
miss a case on merits-related grounds before considering non-merits de-
fenses such as lack of jurisdiction.110 This rule defers consideration of the 
merits of the case until jurisdictional matters are resolved. One effect, 
among others, is to encourage settlement in cases where the plaintiff has a 
stronger case on jurisdiction than the merits, for a defendant may prefer to 
avoid an adverse jurisdictional ruling. 
Arbitration presents a much different decisional sequence in these cir-
cumstances. In contrast to judges, arbitrators are not subject to strict se-
quencing rules that require them to resolve jurisdictional matters before 
turning to the merits. Virtually all arbitral rules are silent on the sequence 
in which arbitrators must resolve issues; the issue is effectively left to the 
arbitrator’s near-total discretion.111 As a result of this discretion, arbitra-
108. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Enforcing Vacated International Arbitration Awards: An Eco-
nomic Approach, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 451, 470–71 (2000) (explaining the difference between 
default and mandatory rules in the context of arbitration); Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting 
Around RUAA: Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, and Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 3 PEPP.
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 419, 420–21 (2003) (same). 
109. See ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 93–94 (2009). 
110. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998). 
111. See, e.g, Int’l Chamber of Commerce [ICC], Rules of Arbitration (Jan. 1, 1998), http:// 
www.iccwbo.org/ uploadedfiles/ court/ arbitration/ other/ rules_ arb_ english.pdf; Am. Arbitration 
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tors can pretermit jurisdictional objections pending full briefing on the 
merits of the case.112 Under Steel Company, such a course would be un-
available to the district judge. This difference can have a powerful effect 
on resource investment and settlement incentives. It does not, however, 
exert as extensive an impact on law development. 
1. Parties’ Behavior 
The parties’ ability to contract around horizontal sequencing rules has 
a powerful effect on the parties’ settlement incentives. The greater discre-
tion accorded to the arbitrator favors the party with superior resources. 
This is because the option to pretermit a jurisdictional ruling increases the 
parties’ costs during the period of time that they are briefing the merits 
and awaiting a ruling on jurisdiction. 
This rule does not necessarily favor plaintiffs (or “claimants” in arbi-
tral lexicon). This is due to the arbitrator’s power under most rules (at 
least international ones) to allocate costs and attorneys’ fees upon the con-
clusion of the arbitration.113 Consequently, if the arbitrator ultimately de-
cided to enter an award finding that it lacked jurisdiction, it might require 
the claimant to bear all the costs of the arbitration as well as the defen-
dant’s (“respondent’s” in arbitral lexicon) attorneys’ fees. The prospect of 
that order could actually encourage claimants to settle, if they feared they 
had a close case on jurisdiction. 
2. Resource Investment 
Contracting around horizontal sequencing rules can also increase judi-
cial actors’ investment of resources. It requires them to learn an increased 
array of issues on which the case might turn (in contrast to the Steel Com-
pany rule that can largely relieve the judge of the need to learn the merits 
of the case). This added investment of resources, likewise, could affect the 
parties’ settlement incentives, at least under arbitral rules where the arbi-
trators’ fees are a function of the investment of time, rather than the 
amount in controversy.114
A party might attempt to counteract the dual effect of this decisional 
sequence on settlement incentives through regulating the allocation of costs 
Ass’n [AAA], International Dispute Resolution Procedures (June 1, 2009), http:// www.adr.org/ 
sp.asp? id=33994. 
112. See Vivendi, S.A. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C06-1524JLR, 2007 WL 1168819, at *2 
(W.D. Wash. 2007) (unpublished decision on jurisdictional discovery); aff’d 586 F.3d 689 (2009). 
113. See, e.g., ICC, Rules of Arbitration, art. 31 (Jan. 1, 1998), http:// www.iccwbo.org/ uploa-
dedfiles/ court/ arbitration/ other/rules_arb_english.pdf. 
114. See, e.g., London Court of Int’l Arbitration [LCIA], Arbitration Rules, art. 28 (Jan. 1, 1998), 
http:// www.lcia.org/ Dispute_Resolution_Services/ LCIA_Arbitration_Rules .aspx#article28. 
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and attorneys’ fees ex ante. Some arbitration clauses specify that parties 
will bear their own costs and fees, and most arbitral rules respect the par-
ties’ choice in this regard (operating as default rules rather than mandatory 
rules).115 Provided that the law of the arbitral forum respects this choice, a 
provision of this sort can alter the settlement dynamics. Specifically, a 
clause requiring each party to bear its own costs and fees would put great-
er pressure on the respondent to settle the case, for it might be more diffi-
cult for the respondent to recoup those expenses. 
3. Law Development 
While the potentially different decisional sequence influences both the 
parties’ settlement incentives and the arbitrator’s investment of resources, 
it does not have as profound an effect on legal development. For one 
thing, questions arise over whether arbitral awards represent “precedents” 
at all.116 Even if they do, as some scholars have suggested in the context of 
subsequent arbitral tribunals consulting the awards of prior tribunals, the 
content of those awards is not likely to change as a result of the award. 
Even after the hearing on the merits, most arbitrators will ascertain their 
jurisdiction before opining on the merits of the case in their award. In this 
respect, the effect of a contract is not to alter the order in which issues are 
decided but, instead, potentially affect the timing of that decision. It is this 
difference in timing between ordinary litigation and arbitration that works 
the effect seen here.  
B. Contractual Manipulation of Vertical Rules 
Contractual manipulation of decisional sequencing rules can have a di-
rect effect on courts’ behavior. Consider the principles under United States 
law governing the kompetenz-kompetenz principle in arbitration. Generally 
speaking, according to this principle, arbitral tribunals have jurisdiction to 
determine their own jurisdiction.117 As the Supreme Court of the United 
States has articulated the principle in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. 
Kaplan, however, courts may decide challenges to the enforceability of the 
arbitration at the outset of a dispute—subject to an important exception: 
namely, arbitrators will resolve these issues when the parties have em-
ployed clear and unmistakable language expressing that preference.118
115. See, e.g., LCIA, Arbitration Rules, art. 28.4 (Jan. 1, 1998), http:// www.lcia.org/ Dispute_ 
Resolution_ Services/ LCIA_ Arbitration_ Rules.aspx#article28. 
116. For an insightful discussion, see W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in 
Arbitration, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1895 (2010). 
117. See William W. Park, The Arbitrability Dicta in First Options v. Kaplan: What Sort of Kom-
petenz-Kompetenz Has Crossed the Atlantic?, 12 ARB. INT’L. 137 (1996). 
118. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943–45 (1995). 
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Most arbitral rules (incorporated by reference into the parties’ arbitration 
agreements) include language designed to satisfy the First Options stan-
dard.119 This manipulation can influence resource investment and settle-
ment incentives. 
1. Resource Investment 
Contractual manipulation of vertical rules can affect the decision-
makers’ resource investment. First Options operates as a sort of default 
rule that presumptively requires courts to invest resources at the front end 
of a case (to determine the enforceability of the agreement). The exception 
embedded in First Options, however, enables the parties to contract 
around that rule, thereby reducing the front-end investment that courts 
must make and correspondingly increasing the front-end investment by 
arbitrators to resolve a dispute. 
Sometimes, the resource allocation depends on the form of the con-
tractual manipulation. For example, compare the rules governing forum-
selection clauses and arbitration clauses. The denial of a motion to dismiss 
a case on the basis of a forum-selection clause is not immediately appeala-
ble.120 By contrast, the denial of a motion to stay litigation on the basis of 
an arbitration clause is immediately appealable.121 Sometimes different 
vertical sequencing rules operate even as to similar issues. Compare, for 
example, the treatment of arbitration clauses and forum-selection clauses. 
Both sorts of clauses try to channel disputes into predetermined forums 
before any dispute has arisen. Yet decisions about the enforceability of the 
two sorts of clauses are subject to very different sequencing rules. A 
court’s refusal to enforce an arbitration clause, whether couched in terms 
of a refusal to grant a petition to compel arbitration or a refusal to stay 
litigation in favor of arbitration, is immediately appealable.122 By contrast, 
a court’s refusal to enforce a forum-selection clause, typically in the con-
text of a failure to dismiss a case filed by a party in a forum other than the 
one specified in the clause, is not.123
At first blush, the two outcomes seem paradoxical. Both forum-
selection clauses and arbitration clauses represent contractual attempts to 
regulate ex ante the forum in which any dispute will be resolved. Whether 
119. See, e.g., Grynberg v. BP P.L.C., 585 F. Supp. 2d 50, 54–55 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that 
arbitration agreement’s incorporation of Rule R-8(a) of AAA Rules “constitutes clear and unmistaka-
ble evidence that the parties intended to submit the arbitrability determination to the arbitrator him-
self”); FSC Sec. Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310, 1312–13 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that parties’ adop-
tion of Section 35 of NASD Code was “‘clear and unmistakable’ expression of their intent to leave the 
question of arbitrability to the arbitrators”). 
120. See Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 275 (1998). 
121. 9 U.S.C. § 16 (2006). 
122. Id.
123. Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989). 
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an arbitration clause or a choice of forum clause, disputes over the enfor-
ceability arise in identical situations—either (a) where one party preferred 
ex ante not to agree to the contractually designated forum but lacked the 
bargaining power to object; or (b) where one party preferred the contrac-
tual forum at the time of the contract’s execution but, subsequently, has 
decided that circumventing the clause advances its interest (or hinders its 
opponent’s interest).124 Lastly, the party seeking to enforce the clause is 
enduring an independent cost by being forced to sue (or defend) in a fo-
rum other than the contractually specified one (in this respect, the forum-
selection or arbitration clause operates as a sort of immunity from suit in 
other jurisdictions). 
Perhaps it is possible to explain the difference by reference to the par-
ties’ intentions. When entering into a forum-selection clause, the parties in 
all events intend to have their dispute heard before a trial court (though 
they may disagree over the identity of the forum).125 By contrast, when 
entering into an arbitration clause, they intend to take their dispute out of 
court already. Thus, if they use clear and unambiguous language seeking 
to reverse the default presumption on kompetenz-kompetenz, then the need 
for immediate judicial correction of the error is greater.126
2. Parties’ Behavior 
The kompetenz-kompetenz doctrine also illustrates how contractual 
manipulation of vertical rules influences the parties’ settlement incentives. 
The default rule conceptualized by First Options favors the position of the 
party opposed to arbitration. It grants that party more immediate access to 
a court and forces the party favoring arbitration to expend more resources 
in order to obtain its desired (and the contractually agreed-upon) result. 
The “clear and unmistakable” exception in First Options enables the party 
preferring arbitration to offset this settlement incentive by keeping more 
issues within the primary jurisdiction of the arbitrator and, thereby, block-
ing an opponent from seeking immediate judicial recourse in its challenge 
to the arbitration agreement. 
124. The model assumes, furthermore, that the other party consistently prefers to enforce the forum 
clause. Otherwise, the right to resolve the dispute in the contractually agreed-upon forum, like any 
contractual right, would be waived, and the dispute would not arise. 
125. By characterizing things this way, I do not mean to make light of the significant procedural 
differences between forums, particularly in matters of transnational litigation where the choice of 
forum will determine a party’s access to certain, important procedural tools like class actions and 
discovery. 
126. A distinct but related issue is the parties’ ability to manipulate contractually not simply the 
order of review but also the substantive standard. While the Supreme Court recently frowned on one 
such effort, see Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585–86 (2008), opportunities remain 
through the creative use of choice-of-law clauses. See Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190 
P.3d 586, 606 n.22 (Cal. 2008). Special thanks to Ingrid Wuerth and Andrea Bjorkland for their 
insights on this point. 
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A comparison with other countries’ kompetenz-kompetenz rules illu-
strates how the form of rule influences the settlement incentives.127 Under 
the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law, the arbitral tribunal has the pri-
mary authority to resolve jurisdictional challenges subject to an immediate 
and limited right of judicial review.128 Compared to the First Options de-
fault rule, this tilts the settlement leverage slightly in favor of the party 
favoring arbitration. Under the German version of the same principle, a 
party opposing arbitration may immediately challenge the enforceability of 
the agreement without awaiting a ruling by the tribunal, but the tribunal 
may continue to proceed while the judicial challenge is pending.129 This 
tilts the settlement leverage slightly in favor of the party resisting arbitra-
tion (particularly if she can convince the tribunal to stay the arbitral pro-
ceeding pending the judicial challenge). Finally, under the French version 
of the doctrine, the party challenging the enforceability of the agreement 
must wait until the conclusion of the arbitral proceeding before seeking 
judicial review.130 This tilts settlement leverage strongly in favor of the 
party preferring arbitration, for it forces her opponent to invest resources 
in the entire arbitral proceeding before obtaining judicial review (or, to 
spare those resources, default on the arbitration entirely, a strategy which 
carries its own risks).131
3. Law Development 
The contractual manipulation of vertical sequencing rules also influ-
ences law development. For example, the default version of the kompe-
tenz-kompetenz doctrine under First Options facilitates the development of 
precedent on the enforceability of arbitral clauses. By contrast, the French 
version retards it by requiring parties to endure the entire arbitration be-
fore they can obtain an opinion on the enforceability of the agreement. 
While the preceding example illustrates how parties can contractually 
manipulate vertical sequencing rules to obtain precedent, other aspects of 
arbitration can retard it. Consider class actions. In a garden-variety piece 
127. For a comparative analysis of the approaches to kompetenz-kompetenz and the underlying 
effects on the underlying values at stake, see Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, Negative Effect of 
Competence-Competence: The Rule of Priority in Favour of the Arbitrators, in ENFORCEMENT OF 
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS: THE NEW YORK CONVENTION
IN PRACTICE 257, 260–61 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Domenico Di Pietro eds., 2008).
128. See UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW [UNCITRAL], MODEL LAW ON 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, art. 16 (Jan. 1, 1985), http:// www.uncitral.org/ pdf/ english/ texts/ 
arbitration/ ml-arb/ 06-54671_Ebook.pdf. 
129. See ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Jan. 30, 1877, 
REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL] 284, § 1032 (Ger.). 
130. See CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND PROBLEMS 311 
(2d ed. 2006). 
131. See William W. Park, The Arbitrability Dicta in First Options v. Kaplan: What Sort of Kom-
petenz-Kompetenz Has Crossed the Atlantic?, 12 ARB. INT’L. 137 (1996). 
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of civil litigation, a district court’s class certification may be immediately 
appealable.132 This does not necessarily occur in arbitration unless, per-
haps, the arbitral rules allow this.133 Where they do not, the parties have to 
wait until the arbitrator enters a final award on the merits, and the losing 
party can seek to attack the class certification in a more general vacatur 
attack on the award. Even then, however, an erroneous class certification 
would not clearly fall under any of the grounds for attacking an arbitral 
award under § 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act.134 Unless the manifest 
disregard of the law doctrine were expanded—if it survived the Supreme 
Court’s possible interment in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc.135—
erroneous class certifications by an arbitrator would go uncorrected.136
C. Contractual Manipulation of Transjurisdictional Rules 
Contractual decisions by the parties can alter the effect of transjuris-
dictional rules. Consider, for example, the effect of an arbitration agree-
ment on postaward proceedings. In ordinary circumstances, the prevailing 
party in an arbitration will seek to enforce the award in the country where 
the award debtor has assets.137 By contrast, the award debtor will petition 
to vacate the award, typically in the courts of the arbitral forum and theo-
retically also in the country supplying the procedural law of the arbitra-
tion.138 Such manipulation of the transjurisdictional rules influences re-
source investment, settlement incentives, and precedent development. 
132. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (“A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or 
denying class-action certification under this rule . . . .”). See also Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 
1259, 1263–64 (10th Cir. 2009); Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 402 F.3d 952, 957–59 (9th Cir. 
2005). 
133. See AAA, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, Rule 5(d) (Oct. 8, 2008), http:// 
www.adr.org/ sp.asp?id=21936. 
134. See 9 U.S.C. §10 (2006). 
135. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
136. See DRAHOZAL, supra note 130, at 574–75; Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., 604 F.3d 1313 
(11th Cir. 2010) (holding that the manifest disregard of the law doctrine did not survive Hall Street); 
Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 350 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Hall Street restricts the 
grounds for vacatur to those set forth in § 10 of the [FAA], and consequently, manifest disregard of 
the law is no longer an independent ground for vacating arbitration awards under the FAA.”). But see 
Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, L.L.C., 300 F. App’x 415, 418 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[Hall Street] did not 
foreclose federal courts’ review for an arbitrator’s manifest disregard of the law.”). See generally 
Kevin P. Murphy, Note, Alive But Not Well: Manifest Disregard After Hall Street, 44 GA. L. REV.
285 (2009) (discussing viability of manifest disregard after Hall Street). 
137. Int’l Commercial Disputes Comm. Of the Ass’n of the Bar of N.Y.C., Lack of Jurisdiction 
and Forum Non Conveniens as Defenses to the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 15 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 407, 432–33 (2004) (“[A]ward creditors ordinarily bring . . . enforcement proceedings in 
jurisdictions where they believe the award debtors have assets against which the award can be en-
forced.”). 
138. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, art. V.1.e., June 10, 1958, available at http:// www.uncitral.org/ pdf/ english/ texts/ arbitra-
tion/ NY-conv/ 1958_NYC_ CTC-e.pdf [hereinafter New York Convention]; Karaha Bodas Co. v. 
Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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1. Resource Investment 
The choice of arbitration can operate as a sort of rigid sequencing rule 
that enhances the investment of resources by the courts of the arbitral fo-
rum. The enforcement architecture of international arbitral awards favors 
proceedings in those forums. Under Article V.1.e of the New York Con-
vention, if the courts in those forums vacate the award, that decision may 
deprive the award of enforceable value in an enforcement jurisdiction.139
Yet the prevailing party in the arbitration can attempt to dampen the ef-
fects of this rule. Article VI of the New York Convention authorizes 
courts in the enforcement forum to stay their proceedings pending the out-
come of the vacatur proceedings in the arbitral forum.140 The decision to 
stay is discretionary, not mandatory. Consequently, a court committed to 
enforcing an award can do so even in the face of pending vacatur proceed-
ings elsewhere. This injects flexibility back into the transjurisdictional 
sequencing rules. 
Contrast this set of outcomes on resource investment with the transju-
risdictional rules governing the enforcement of forum-selection clauses. 
The Hague Choice of Courts Convention, if ratified, would create further 
opportunities for parties to manipulate transjurisdictional sequencing rules 
through forum-selection clauses. Under that Convention, courts generally 
must suspend or dismiss cases if they are not the court specified in the 
forum-selection agreement.141 Conversely, the court specified in the fo-
rum-selection agreement generally may not dismiss the case in favor of 
another forum such as on forum non conveniens grounds. The net effect of 
these provisions is to override the first-to-file incentive that might exist 
under current rules that are more tolerant of parallel proceedings. 
2. Parties’ Behavior 
Parties can contractually manipulate the effect of transjurisdictional 
rules in a manner that affects their settlement incentives. Consider, for 
example, the well-known Chromalloy problem in international arbitra-
tion.142 As noted above, the vacatur of the arbitral award by the courts of 
139. There currently is a split on this question. See DRAHOZAL, supra note 130 at 576–77; Termo-
rio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta, S.P., 487 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
140. See New York Convention, supra note 138, art. VI. 
141. See Hague Convention on Choice of Courts Agreements, art. 6, June 30, 2005, reprinted in
44 I.L.M. 1294. 
142. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Enforcing Vacated International Arbitration Awards: An 
Economic Approach, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 451 (2000); Jan Paulsson, Enforcing Arbitral Awards 
Notwithstanding a Local Standard Annulment (LSA), ICC INT’L CT. ARB. BULL., at 14 (May 1998); 
Jan Paulsson, The Case for Disregarding LSAs (Local Standard Annulments) Under the New York 
Convention, 7 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 99 (1996); Jan Paulsson, Rediscovering the N.Y. Convention: 
Further Reflections on Chromalloy, INT’L ARB. REP., April 1997, at 20; Albert Jan van den Berg, 
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the arbitral forum can deprive the award of enforceable effect in third-
country jurisdictions. Some courts in enforcement jurisdictions, such as 
the Second Circuit in Baker Marine (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nigeria) 
Ltd., have held that the act of vacatur requires that they not enforce the 
award.143 Other courts, such as the District of Columbia district court in 
Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt, have held that they 
have the discretion to enforce the award irrespective of the vacatur by the 
courts of the arbitral forum.144
The outcome on this question critically influences the parties’ settle-
ment incentives. The Baker Marine view enhances the settlement leverage 
of the award debtor. If the award debtor can successfully obtain vacatur in 
the arbitral forum, that outcome can completely cut off the award credi-
tor’s right to recovery in the desired enforcement jurisdiction (and thereby 
induce the award creditor to settle before vacatur proceedings are com-
menced).145 By contrast, the Chromalloy view enhances the settlement 
leverage of the award creditor. Even if the award debtor successfully ob-
tains vacatur in the arbitral forum, the award creditor can seek enforce-
ment in those jurisdictions that still will honor the award (and presumably 
where the award debtor has assets).146
3. Law Development 
Contractual manipulation of transjurisdictional rules has a more li-
mited effect on law development. The primary area where an impact can 
be seen is in the area of antisuit injunctions to vindicate forum-selection 
clauses. As discussed in greater detail in Part IV, federal courts disagree 
sharply over the general standard governing the availability of antisuit 
injunctions.147 Yet they seem united around the idea that an antisuit injunc-
tion is entirely proper where necessary to prevent a party from circum-
venting a forum-selection clause.148 By entering the antisuit injunction, it 
ensures that the designated court—and not the court sought by the party 
seeking to circumvent the forum-selection clause—articulates the substan-
tive rules governing the parties’ rights and obligations. Thereby, this en-
Enforcement of Annulled Awards?, ICC INT’L CT. ARB. BULL., at 15 (Nov. 1998). 
143. See Baker Marine (Nigeria) Ltd. v. Chevron (Nigeria) Ltd., 191 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 1999). 
144. See Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996). 
See generally William W. Park, Duty and Discretion in International Arbitration, 93 AM. J. INT’L L.
805 (1999). 
145. Of course, given the differing views among national courts on the Baker Marine-Chromalloy
question, award creditors still may be able to enforce the award in the courts of countries that do not 
categorically preclude enforcement of vacated arbitral awards. See BORN, supra note 97, at 2815–26. 
146. See Chromalloy, 939 F. Supp. at 913–14. See also van den Berg, supra note 142, at 15. 
147. See infra Part IV. 
148. See Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 1996). I thank Harris Martin for his 
observations on this point. 
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hances law production in the designated forum while retarding it in the 
alternative forum. 
In sum, parties’ manipulation of decisional sequencing rules reallo-
cates the default investment of resources by the decision-maker, enhances 
the settlement leverage of the party seeking to designate a particular fo-
rum, and can retard the development of precedent. The following table 
summarizes the effects of contractual manipulation on decisional sequenc-
ing rules: 
The final Part of this Article synthesizes the lessons from the preced-
ing Parts and applies them to three thorny problems of decisional sequenc-
ing currently bedeviling courts. 
Type of Rule Effect of Contractual Manipula-
tion 
Horizontal 
(1) Reallocates investment of 
resources 
(2) Enhances settlement leverage 
of party seeking to designate 
forum 
(3) Can retard the development 
of precedent 
Vertical 
(1) Reallocates investment of 
resources 
(2) Enhances settlement leverage 
of party seeking to designate 
forum 
(3) Can retard the development 
of precedent 
Transjurisdictional 
(1) Reallocates investment of 
resources 
(2) Enhances settlement leverage 
of party seeking to designate 
forum 
(3) Can retard the development 
of precedent 
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IV. CURRENT PUZZLES
This Part applies the lessons developed in the preceding three parts to 
current sequencing dilemmas bedeviling courts and policymakers. With 
respect to horizontal sequencing rules, I consider how the act of state de-
fense should be treated under the Steel Company-Sinochem line of cases. 
With respect to vertical sequencing rules, I consider the immediate appea-
lability of denials of motions to dismiss under the political question and 
comity doctrines. With respect to transjurisdictional sequencing rules, I 
consider the availability of antisuit injunctions and lis pendens stays in 
transnational litigation. 
A. Horizontal Rules: The Act of State Doctrine 
Under the act of state doctrine, a court shall not sit in judgment of the 
validity of the act of a foreign state that takes place within the sovereign 
territory of that state.149 The doctrine, rooted in substantive federal com-
mon law, is traditionally understood as having three elements. First, there 
must be an act of state, understood to include a “statute, decree, order, or 
resolution” of a foreign sovereign.150 Second, the doctrine only applies 
when the lawsuit requires a court to sit in judgment of the validity of the 
act; thus, the doctrine does not bar federal jurisdiction where a court 
merely is required to consider a foreign sovereign’s motives for the act.151
Third, the act must have the required territorial nexus with the foreign 
state; an act taking place outside the sovereign’s territory would not trig-
ger the act of state doctrine.152 Even where all three elements are satisfied, 
various defenses may preclude the doctrine’s application. These include, 
potentially, an exception for commercial activities (as opposed to sove-
reign acts); the Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche exception 
(where the Executive Branch informs the court that, in its view, the case 
does not interfere with the foreign relations of the United States); a treaty 
exception (where a treaty sets forth clear and precise criteria for evaluat-
ing the claim); and various exceptions set forth in specific federal sta-
tutes.153
Defendants typically advance act of state defenses at the pleading stage 
of litigation in their motion to dismiss alongside other defenses such as 
149. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964). See generally BORN &
RUTLEDGE, supra note 30, at 753–54. 
150. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695 (1976). 
151. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990). 
152. See, e.g., Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222, 224 (2d Cir. 1985). 
153. See, e.g., Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 706; Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 173 
F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949); Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov’t of Socialist 
Eth., 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984); 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (2006). 
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lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, improper 
venue, and failure to state a claim. The procedural posture of this defense 
gives rise to a question—are dismissals on act of state grounds more like 
“non-merits” dismissals, such as on forum non conveniens grounds, whe-
reby a court may resolve them first? Or are they more like merits de-
fenses, such as failure to state a claim, whereby a court must first resolve 
jurisdictional objections before turning to the act of state defense? 
As with other horizontal sequencing rules, the stakes are significant. If 
the act of state doctrine qualifies as a non-merits defense, that will reduce 
a judicial investment of resources, enhance a defendant’s settlement leve-
rage, and alter the production of law on other non-merits grounds. If the 
act of state doctrine instead qualifies as a merits defense, that conclusion 
will potentially increase a judicial investment of resources, reduce the de-
fendant’s settlement leverage (particularly where the plaintiff is demanding 
jurisdictional discovery), and increase the production of law on other non-
merits defenses (while potentially retarding the development of law elabo-
rating on the act of state doctrine). 
The D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudence provides a particularly good lens 
through which to analyze this problem. For over a decade, it has consis-
tently adhered to the view that a court cannot consider an act of state de-
fense before first determining whether it has jurisdiction.154 The effect of 
this sequencing rule is particularly profound in cases against foreign sove-
reigns. It forces district courts to consider whether subject matter jurisdic-
tion exists under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act155 (FSIA) before 
deciding whether it can dismiss the case on other grounds. In doing so, the 
court must thus consider matters such as whether the sovereign has com-
mitted a noncommercial tort or engaged in an illegal expropriation, deter-
minations that have political and doctrinal consequences even if the court 
ultimately dismisses the case. Moreover, to the extent the subject matter 
determination requires a highly fact-sensitive determination, the rule can 
subject foreign sovereigns to jurisdictional discovery. Since the jurisdic-
tional inquiry under the FSIA often overlaps with the merits of the case, 
this jurisdictional discovery can affirmatively aid the plaintiffs’ case. The 
net effect of the D.C. Circuit’s steady rule (which admittedly has not been 
tested since Sinochem) is to give substantial leverage to plaintiffs, to in-
crease the district court’s investment of resources, and to retard the devel-
opment of precedent glossing the act of state doctrine. 
Viewed against the model developed here, the D.C. Circuit’s view 
seems difficult to defend. Considered along the same three axes—resource 
154. See In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Marra v. Papandreou, 216 F.3d 
1119, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2000); World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kaz., 296 F.3d 1154, 1161 
(D.C. Cir. 2002). 
155. 28 U.S.C. § 1604–1607 (2006). 
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investment, parties’ incentives, and law development—the act of state doc-
trine seems difficult to distinguish from other non-merits defenses that, 
under the flexible sequencing rules set forth in Ruhrgas and Sinochem, a 
district court has the discretion to select as the grounds for decision. Im-
mediate resolution under the act of state doctrine, much like immediate 
resolution under the forum non conveniens doctrine, reduces the invest-
ment of district court resources and reduces the burdens on defendants, 
and those considerations are especially compelling in the act of state con-
text where the very maintenance of the lawsuit potentially treads upon the 
sovereign interests of a foreign government.  
In the D.C. Circuit’s defense, one might argue that it’s eminently ap-
propriate to defer ruling on the act of state issues because they are likelier 
to tread upon the merits of the case—such as whether an act of state is 
involved or whether the claim requires the court to “sit in judgment of the 
case”—issues more appropriately resolved by the district court after it has 
resolved the non-merits jurisdictional objections. Yet that argument is dif-
ficult to square with determinations under the FSIA, where the very juris-
dictional determinations necessitate consideration of issues treading upon 
the merits of the case (such as whether a foreign official was acting within 
the scope of employment)—determinations that unquestionably occur at the 
outset of a case. Thus, it is hard to justify treating act of state determina-
tions any differently.
B. Vertical Rules: Political Question and Comity Doctrines 
The political question and comity doctrines should be familiar to most 
readers and require only brief review here. Under the political question 
doctrine, a federal court will not exercise jurisdiction over an issue tex-
tually committed to a coordinate constitutional branch that lacks judicially 
manageable standards.156 Separation-of-powers principles underpin this 
doctrine. The contours of the comity doctrine are slightly less clear.157
While “comity” influences a variety of subjects, ranging from transjuris-
dictional discovery disputes to enforcement of foreign judgments, one con-
tour of the doctrine operates as a freestanding defense to a lawsuit.158 In 
this latter, freestanding form, the comity doctrine operates as an abstention 
principle—it provides a basis upon which a federal court declines to exer-
cise jurisdiction over a case. Separation-of-powers principles also underpin 
this doctrine. 
156. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
157. See William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Courts, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., avail-
able at http:// www.asil.org/ files/ dodge.pdf. 
158. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987); 
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
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While the contours of the doctrines are both familiar, the treatment of 
these doctrines under appellate jurisdiction rules is perhaps less so. As 
with the act of state doctrine, defendants often urge courts to dismiss cases 
under political question and comity doctrines at the pleading stage. Where 
courts decline those defenses (along with others), vertical sequencing is-
sues arise—namely, whether the disappointed party can obtain immediate 
appellate review of a district court’s order refusing to dismiss a case on 
either (or both) of these grounds. 
Here again, the stakes are significant. If orders denying motions to 
dismiss on these grounds are immediately appealable, that view will assist 
defendants’ settlement leverage, require a greater investment of appellate 
resources, and promote the development of appellate caselaw on the topic. 
By contrast, if those orders are not immediately appealable, that view aids 
plaintiffs’ settlement leverage, requires a greater investment of trial court 
resources, and retards the development of appellate caselaw on the topic. 
The appealability of these orders also potentially implicates the separation-
of-powers values underpinning both doctrines. Immediate reviewability 
ensures an opportunity to correct erroneous district court orders denying 
these decisions. By contrast, deferring review until final judgment en-
hances the risk that the separation-of-powers values will be damaged for 
the duration of the lawsuit in the district court. 
Recently, the United States Government weighed in on the issue in lit-
igation stemming from corporate activities in South Africa during the 
Apartheid Era. The details of the underlying litigation have been summa-
rized elsewhere and need not detain us here.159 For present purposes, it 
suffices to observe that, in the current iteration of the lawsuit, plaintiffs 
representing a class of South African citizens sued several multinational 
companies under the Alien Tort Statute.160 Their suit was premised on 
allegations that the companies aided and abetted the South African Gov-
ernment by facilitating certain policies of the apartheid regime.161 The dis-
trict court denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss rejecting, 
among other things, its comity defense. After defendants sought interlocu-
tory appeal of this decision, the United States Government filed an amicus
brief arguing that the Second Circuit lacked appellate jurisdiction.162 The 
Government reasoned that a district court’s order denying a motion to 
159. See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees, In re S. 
African Apartheid Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (2d Cir. 2009), available at http:// 
www.khulumani.net/ attachments/ 348_SA%20 Litigation%20 -%20US%20 Gov%20Amicus 
%20Dec%202009.pdf [hereinafter Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae]. In the interest of full 
disclosure, I should note that I served as counsel for amicus curiae in this matter which supported the 
Appellant. 
160. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 624 F. Supp. 2d. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
161. Id. at 546. 
162. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 159. 
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dismiss on comity grounds is not immediately appealable unless the Gov-
ernment affirmatively certifies that the maintenance of the case interferes 
with the foreign relations of the United States.163
The analysis developed above suggests that the proper answer should 
turn on which array of factors should predominate. Immediate appealabili-
ty of denials to dismiss on grounds of the comity doctrine would enhance 
defendants’ bargaining position, promote law development on the issue, 
and reduce the docket burdens on trial courts. By contrast, requiring a 
denial on these grounds to await final judgment enhances the plaintiffs’ 
settlement incentives, undermines development of the comity doctrine, and 
increases the burdens on trial courts (at least to the extent the political 
question issue is dispositive). These considerations, moreover, may cut in 
different directions—for example, there may be a need to gloss the mean-
ing of the comity doctrine which plays against an awareness that imme-
diate appellate review (at least absent clear statutory guidance) undermines 
the final judgment rule. 
The difficulty with the United States Government’s position is that it 
arrogates to the Executive Branch a power to balance these factors, a 
power otherwise enjoyed by Congress and the courts. When Congress 
crafts an exception to the final judgment rule, it has weighed the underly-
ing values and set forth a prospective categorical determination. Absent 
clear guidance from Congress, courts undertake a similar balancing under 
the guise of the Cohen doctrine. Yet the Government’s approach in the 
South Africa litigation thwarts this distribution of power among the 
branches of government. It reallocates to the Executive Branch an ability 
to make a case-by-case determination on how to weigh those values. 
C. Transjurisdictional Rules: Antisuit Injunctions 
The standards governing the issuance of antisuit injunctions provide a 
current dilemma of determining the proper transjurisdictional sequencing 
rules. Like lis alibi pendens, antisuit injunctions serve to control parallel 
litigation in different forums. While a stay lis alibi pendens stops the liti-
gation in one forum in favor of another, and in this respect it is not unlike 
a doctrine of abstention, an antisuit injunction bars a party subject to a 
court’s jurisdiction from pursuing a parallel action in a foreign forum.164
Neither a treaty nor a federal statute authorizes a court to issue these 
orders (much less guides their discretion when to issue them). Instead, 
these devices have evolved as part of a residual federal common law pow-
er. In the exercise of that power, courts have articulated two very different 
163. See Id.
164. See generally George Bermann, The Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Litigation,
28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 589 (1990). 
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standards governing when they will issue. As to antisuit injunctions, some 
courts hold that such injunctions may issue only where necessary to pro-
tect a court’s jurisdiction; other courts employ a multifactor balancing test 
and embody a more liberal approach to the issue.165 As noted above, while 
there appears to be consensus that antisuit injunctions are available to vin-
dicate forum-selection clauses, deep divisions exist among the federal cir-
cuits over whether to grant them absent such clauses.166
As with the preceding examples, the choice of the proper rule is criti-
cal. Courts disfavoring stays lis alibi pendens and disfavoring antisuit in-
junctions both effectively encourage parallel litigation. These approaches 
place settlement pressure on the party less able to finance parallel litiga-
tion, particularly in jurisdictions or settings that do not allow fee shifting. 
They also encourage a “rush to judgment” by the courts in the two fo-
rums—a judgment rendered by the first court can then be recognized under 
res judicata rules of the slower jurisdiction. By contrast, courts favoring 
stays lis alibi pendens and antisuit injunctions have the opposite effect. 
They disfavor parallel proceedings (and thus aid the less well capitalized 
party in a dispute); from the courts’ perspective, they do not encourage a 
rush to judgment. They do, however, encourage a “race to the court-
house” by the parties—for the first party to file then is able to argue that it 
would be “inefficient” for the second court to hear a parallel action in the 
case. Considerations of comity underpin both doctrines—both a liberal 
approach to stays and a conservative approach to antisuit injunctions re-
duce the risk of disrupting foreign relations. By contrast, conservative 
approaches to stays and liberal approaches to antisuit injunctions entail a 
greater risk of that disruption. 
The First Circuit’s decision in Quaak v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goer-
deler Bedrijfsrevisoren illustrates the stakes.167 That case involved parallel 
litigation between a Belgian branch of KPMG (KPMG-B) and a publicly 
traded company, Lernout & Houspie Speech Products N.V. (L&H), for 
whom it served as auditor. After L&H collapsed, various interested parties 
brought massive securities fraud actions against KPMG-B in the United 
States. In the midst of those proceedings, the plaintiffs sought massive 
discovery from KPMG-B, which a magistrate court ordered.168 Mean-
while, KPMG-B sought relief in a Belgian court, requesting penalties 
against parties who might take steps to comply with the discovery proceed-
ings in the United States litigation. In response, plaintiffs in the United 
States actions sought an antisuit injunction to bar KPMG-B from pursuing 
165. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 30, at 529–40. 
166. Id.
167. 361 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2004). 
168. Id. at 14. 
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the Belgian action, which the district court granted.169 Affirming the dis-
trict court’s order, the First Circuit held that the antisuit injunction was 
proper. It eschewed either of the above-described leading approaches, 
though it expressed greater sympathy for the conservative approach.170
Departing from the conservative approach, however, the First Circuit de-
clined to conclude that jurisdiction-protection and protection of important 
national policies provided the exclusive bases to overcome the presump-
tion against antisuit injunctions (and in favor of parallel proceedings).171
Instead, the Court reasoned that a wider array of factors, including the 
nature of the parallel actions, the posture of the proceedings, the conduct 
of the parties, the importance of the policies at stake, and the effect of the 
parallel proceeding all were relevant to deciding whether a party seeking 
an antisuit injunction had overcome the comity-based presumption against 
its issuance.172
Here, the First Circuit probably gets it right, though there is a reason-
able argument for the liberal approach favoring antisuit injunctions too. 
Both approaches undertake the sort of explicit interest balancing that, ac-
cording to Part II of this Article, underpins most sequencing determina-
tions. By contrast, the conservative approach artificially elevates labels 
(like jurisdictional protection) over the factors actually guiding the analy-
sis. Between the two approaches that engage in explicit interest balancing, 
the First Circuit’s approach more closely tracks the sorts of factors devel-
oped in Part II. In particular, the focus on party conduct and the effect of 
parallel proceedings tracks the consideration of parties’ behavior devel-
oped above; the reference to the posture of the proceedings takes into ac-
count the investment of resources already made by the trial court; finally, 
consideration of the policy interests picks up on notions how the choice of 
transjurisdictional sequencing rules can affect law development in both 
forums.  
Whatever the correct outcome to these doctrinal puzzles, it is worth 
emphasizing the “default rule” quality of these standards. Parties can en-
hance the likelihood of an antisuit injunction where they have contractually 
agreed upon a forum. Careful examination of the available precedent on 
the issue reveals that courts are more likely to issue antisuit injunctions 
where a party is bringing parallel litigation in an effort to circumvent a 
forum-selection clause.173
169. Id.
170. Id. at 18. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 19. 
173. Likewise, as the recent decision of the European Court of Justice in the West Tankers case 
illustrates, European courts may be more willing to issue antisuit injunctions when parties are bringing 
parallel litigation in an effort to circumvent an arbitration clause. See Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA & 
Generali Assicurazioni Generali SpA v. W. Tankers Inc., 2009 E.C.R. I-663, ¶ 34. 
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CONCLUSION
This Article has filled an important gap in the literature on judicial de-
cision-making and contributed to a growing effort to bridge the chasm that 
traditionally has divided arbitration scholarship from other legal domains. 
Drawing on a rich, interdisciplinary array of sources involving the struc-
ture of choice, it articulated a systematic approach to decisional sequenc-
ing and unified the disparate study of rules governing decisions by single 
actors, multiple actors within a single decision-making system, and, final-
ly, actors across multiple systems of decision-making. Each of those se-
quencing rules, whether rigid or flexible, entailed a similar set of consid-
erations, including the investment of judicial resources, the effect on the 
parties’ behavior, and the development of precedent. To a degree, those 
rules operated simply as default rules that the parties could contract around 
through choice of forum and arbitration clauses. 
Much work remains to be done. Centrally, future work can articulate 
a crisper normative conception of the extent to which particular common 
values in sequencing rules should dominate, particularly where the consid-
erations here cut in different directions.174 Moreover, lurking in the back-
ground is a series of institutional considerations, namely, which branch of 
government appropriately exercises the authority to balance those values 
and articulate the proper sequence. To date, that role has largely been left 
to the courts, with periodic intervention by Congress. The Government’s 
litigating position in the South Africa case, however, suggests that the 
Executive Branch may seek to take a firmer role. Finally, the discussion 
of transjurisdictional rules—particularly against the backdrop of develop-
ments like the Hague Choice of Courts Convention and the proposed ALI 
statute on foreign judgment enforcement (both of which contain lis pen-
dens provisions)—speak to the importance of a richer comparative study of 
transjurisdictional rules and the eventual need for a harmonized approach 
that can accommodate the diverse views of different countries on these 
questions. 
174. A related point here is how to conceptualize the interests of the various affected constituen-
cies, particularly the parties. Much of the analysis in this paper can be understood as reflecting upon 
“supply-side” considerations—that is, how should judges, arbitrators or some other institutional actor 
go about deciding the proper sequencing rule. Of course, an under-developed aspect of this project is 
the demand-side consideration, namely what do the parties want? Here it might be important to diffe-
rentiate between one-shot litigants for whom the only interest is victory and repeat player litigants 
(especially governments) who may have a more significant interest in law development. Special thanks 
to Richard Nagareda and Andrea Bjorkland for their thoughts on this point. 
